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Summary 
In regard to the energy sector, it is generally presumed that in post-Lisbon era 
and since the adoption of Third Energy Package the Member States and 
institutions of the Union act in a shared format. However, by developing new 
legislation in the field, supra-national institutions tend to shift the competence 
away from shared (as it currently stands). Even if the guidelines for decisions 
granting exemptions are laid down in sector specific legislation, the 
Commission tends to 1) grant divergent infrastructure exemptions on a case-
by-case basis and such decisions result in a discriminatory treatment and 2) 
force mandatory investments if entity is dominant and has refrained from 
investing in capacity of the relevant infrastructure. On the other hand, whether 
the remedy should then be rather sought in the realm of competences and the 
respective international agreements? 
While the EU internal natural gas market is subject to the liberalisation 
processes, investing entities might be “locked-up” concerning their decisional 
abilities as legislation overly tries to ensure an equal level playing field for every 
investor. Therefore, one of the possibilities is to challenge the troublesome EU 
law measure under the WTO. Entities transporting the commodity hold the 
highest share of incentives to expand, develop and operate on the market. It 
has to be understood that the Union itself cannot construct the necessary 
infrastructure in order to satisfy the ever-growing consumer demand for 
natural gas. The author emphasises that the EU energy acquis should not 
extend outside the internal market otherwise acquis would fail. 
The Commission has decided to offer an innovative solution to remedy any 
congestion in infrastructure of natural gas transportation by stepping from a 
duty to deal to duty to invest. This is an innovative solution that demands for 
more elaboration as “strategic underinvestment” is prohibited. Why “strategic 
over-investment” then is not a violation of Art.102(b)?  
The author argues that rules related to infrastructure exemption policy and 
rules on competition prescribed in the primary legislation share similar 
characteristics, but both are, nevertheless, applied in different scenarios. It is 
arguable that the Commission acts ultra vires in both legal frameworks. 
Although, the CJEU also has an opportunity to decide upon the application of 
refusal to deal and the respective essential facilities doctrine, it has, 
nonetheless, not chosen to follow the path of the Commission. Overall, the 
author encourages penetration of Art.102(b) TFEU into the sectorial 
legislation, which then would be a suitable mix of two legal disciplines. Such a 
mixed legal instrument then would qualify as a solution for boosting up 
innovation. 
 
 
Keywords: Directive 2009/73, downstream, energy competence, essential 
facilities, exemption policy, GATS, infrastructure foreclosure, innovation, 
interconnectors, investment, midstream, natural gas transportation, refusal to 
deal, shared competence, strategic underinvestment, third party access, 
transmission, WTO 
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Abbreviations 
ACER  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy  
  Regulators 
AG  Advocate General 
Art  Article 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
Directive 2009/73/EC Directive 2009/73/EC of the European  
  Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
  concerning common rules for the internal market 
  in natural gas and repealing Directive  
  2003/55/EC 
DSB  Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
  Organization 
EC Treaty  Treaty establishing the European Community 
ENTSO-G  European Network of Transmission System 
  Operators for Gas 
EU  The European Union 
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
LNG  Liquefied natural gas 
MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of 
  Pollution from Ships, 1973 and as modified by 
  the Protocol of 1978 
MFN  Most favoured nation 
NRA  National regulatory authority 
PCA  EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation  
  Agreement as entered into force on 1 December 
  1997 
TEP  European Union’s Third Energy Internal Market 
  Package as entered into force on 3 September 
  2009 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TPA  Third-party access 
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
  Sea of 10 December 1982 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background 
On May 11, 2015 the Russian Federation made a request for the establishment 
of a panel in complaint against the EU’s Third Energy Package (TEP). One of 
the grounds invoked relates to infrastructure exemption measures.1 According 
to Art.34(1) of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 
while also being a mixed agreement, it is explicitly provided that “the Parties 
shall use their best endeavours to avoid  taking any measures or actions which 
render the conditions for the establishment and operation of each other’s 
companies more restrictive […]”. The provision is construed so as to prevent a 
deterioration of the market conditions under which their respective companies 
operate.2  
Art.65 of PCA prescribes that, in terms of cooperation, the principle of the 
market economy […] shall be observed against the background of the 
progressive integration of the energy markets in the EU.3 For instance, 
cooperation shall also include means, which encourage increased energy trade 
and investment as well as modernisation of interconnection of gas supply 
(Art.65(2)). PCA envisages rather limited legal consequences of its provisions. 
Namely, there is little substance in the agreement.4 Since Russia’s withdrawal 
from the Energy Charter Treaty (now the International Energy Charter)5, EU-
Russia energy cooperation is based purely only on non-legally binding 
commitments and mutual dialogues.  
With regard to the commodity exporters in the EU from third countries, the 
EU internal legislation is constructed in a form in order to “export” the EU 
legal system to third countries – acquis communautaire. Such a model would be 
suitable perhaps for energy producers, which consider the EU as an example 
of the perfect economic development. Hence, the gas exporters to the EU 
from third countries are willing rather to be unaffected by the EU law so that 
                                                
1 WTO, WT/DS476/2, May 28, 2015, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Russian 
Federation. European Union and its Member States – Certain Measures Relating to the Energy Sector. 
Accessed July 20, 2016. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds476_e.htm. 
2 Elsuwege, van Peter, “Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations?”, (2012) 
Ghent University and Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO) (University of Tartu Centre for EU-Russia 
Studies), CEURUS EU-Russia Paper No. 5, at p 13. Accessed July 29, 2016. 
http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/EU-Russia-Paper-51.pdf. Although, Art.36 
of PCA, concerning cross-border supply of services and in relation to no less favourable 
treatment, provides that only sectors listed in Annex 5 of PCA are entitled to such a treatment 
– services related to energy (i.e. natural gas) are not among them. 
3 Felzmann-Schmidt, Anke, “The breakdown of the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia: 
from strategic patience towards a strategic failure”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 
29, Issue 1 (2016): 99-127, at p. 117. 
4 Supra note 2, at pp. 6-7. 
5 Energy Charter Conference, January 15, 2016, The International Energy Charter and Consolidated 
Energy Charter Treaty with Related Documents. Accessed July 27, 2016. 
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf.  
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they could develop, manage and structure their own operations and resources 
independently to maximise the revenue they produce.6  
Due to the historical reasons, the structure of the gas supply chain indicates 
that the means of transportation of natural gas is limited to inflexible pipelines 
requiring large-scale investments.7 Therefore, the transportation of natural gas 
has traditionally been considered as a monopolistic activity. As a consequence, 
today such activities are regulated by the primary and secondary EU legislation 
on TPA and the general principles on open access to the infrastructure. For 
the non-EU energy company it would be economically viable to pursue capital-
intensive energy infrastructure projects in the internal market if such projects 
are financed on the basis of derogation from mandatory TPA. Such type of 
project would require derogation of TPA at least for the period of the return of 
capital invested or during a certain part of the capital return period.8 
Art.36(1) of Directive 2009/73/EC establishes that major new gas 
infrastructure, inter alia, i.e. interconnectors as well as “significant increases of 
capacity in existing infrastructure and to modifications of such infrastructure 
which enable the development of new sources of gas supply” (Art.36(2)) may, 
upon request, be exempted for a defined period of time from TPA (Arts. 32; 
33; 34)), tariffs and unbundling. “New infrastructure” appears to be capacity 
created by constructing new interconnection point, while “expanded or 
modified infrastructure” stands for capacity added by expanding capacity at an 
already existing interconnection point.9 In terms of decisional powers, national 
regulatory authorities have a possibility to decide on exemption.  
Although, Member States are also entitled to make such decisions, based on 
the opinion submitted by the NRA or the ACER (Art.36(3) and Art.36(7)). 
Art.36(9) proposes that the final decision is made by the Commission as it 
holds a power (with a period of maximum 2 months) on whether to require the 
national regulatory authority to amend or withdraw the decision concerning the 
exemption granted. The Commission’s decision becomes final and binding.  
                                                
6 Konoplyanik, Andrey, “Regulating energy relations: Acquis or Energy Charter?”, (2011) 
Centre for European Reform, Pipelines, politics and power – the future of EU-Russia energy 
relations, at pp. 109-110. Accessed August 2, 2016. 
https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/rp_851-
271.pdf. 
7 Internal market of natural gas has passed through substantial changes in terms of market 
restructuring since 1998 with its main aim of liberalisation, see e.g. Directive 98/30/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, 21 July 1998, OJ L 204, 1-12. 
8 Commission Press Release. “Questions and Answers on the third legislative package for an 
internal EU gas and electricity market.” (MEMO/11/125), Brussels, March 2, 2011. Accessed 
July 30, 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-125_lv.htm?locale=en. TEP 
proposes to continue separation of production and supply from transmission networks (i.e. 
ownership unbundling – separation of network activities from commercial activities), facilitate 
cross-border trade in natural gas and promote cross-border collaboration and investment. 
9 Yafimava, Katja, “The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target Model: major 
contentious issues inside and outside the EU”, (2013) The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, at p. 
12. The exemption may cover all or part of the capacity of the newly constructed 
infrastructure, or the existing infrastructure with significantly increased capacity as prescribed 
in Art.36(6). Accessed August 3, 2016. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/NG-75.pdf. 
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It is generally considered that the investors in the pipeline transmission10 
capacity inside the EU are primarily transmission system operators. Whereas 
investors in the pipelines from third countries are primarily the companies 
purchasing and supplying natural gas11 in cooperation with state-owned or 
private companies in the selling country.12 The recovery of investments in 
transmission pipelines is therefore normally based on long-term arrangements 
(agreements). If buyers from the EU would require gas supplies it is of 
paramount importance to ensure that they will not be prevented by any burden 
created by an improper and inadequate regulatory regime for new capacity i.e. 
concerning cross-border pipelines. 
 
1.2. Subject and purpose 
In the first months of 2015 the Commission conceded that the Union’s energy 
system is still underperforming. The Commission also ascertains that the 
current structure of the market does not lead to sufficient investments, the 
internal energy market is still fragmented, while market concentration and weak 
competition also remain as an issue.13 On the way towards a complete Energy 
Union, as proposed by the Commission, it agrees to take an intensified action 
in, among others, diversification of gas supply, the modernisation of energy 
infrastructure, security of supply and the creation of unified internal energy 
market.14 Indeed, the Commission has made a step forward with regard to the 
expansion and modernisation of energy infrastructure as it has already passed a 
Regulation on Guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure.15 In 
addition, ENTSO-G has shared its observations that some investment 
decisions have been delayed because of strong emphasis on the short run and 
absence of a clear vision in long run concerning gas demand and supply.16 
Absence of the new infrastructure risks, nevertheless, of increasing import 
dependency, which is endangering security of supply. 
                                                
10 Art.2(3) of Directive 2009/73/EC defines “transmission” as the transport of natural gas 
through a network, which mainly contains high-pressure pipelines, other than an upstream 
pipeline network and other than the part of high-pressure pipelines primarily used in the 
context of local distribution of natural gas, with a view to its delivery to customers, but not 
including supply. 
11 Art.2(7) of Directive 2009/73/EC defines “supply” as the sale, including resale, of natural 
gas, including LNG, to customers. 
12 Directorate General for Internal Policies, “An Assessment of the Gas and Oil Pipelines in 
Europe (an extensive briefing note)”, (2009) PE 416.239, IP/A/ITRE/NT/2009-13, at p. 15.  
13 Communication from the Commission, “Energy Union Package: A Framework Strategy for 
a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy”. [2015] COM 80 
final, at p. 7 et seq. Accessed August 16, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2015%3A80%3AFIN. 
14 Ibid, at p. 19 et seq. 
15 Regulation (EU) No. 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure with 
the amendments in Regulation (EU) No. 2016/89 as regards the Union list of projects of 
common interest. Regulation provides the list of Projects of Common Interest divided in 
several infrastructure priority corridors and areas, which should receive special funding and 
benefits from “priority status” in permission procedures. 
16 Vohwinkel, Tim, and Scholz, Ulrich, “The Application of EU Competition Law in the 
Energy Sector” J.E.C.L. & Pract., Vol. 7, No. 1 (2016): 56-71, at p. 59. 
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Therefore, the purpose of this research is to elaborate and seek for the most 
effective climate for incentives to invest and available opportunities for 
investing entities. While the Union tries to establish and complete the Energy 
Union, the role and the relationship among the investing entities, national 
institutions, Member States and the supra-national institutions have to be 
elaborated in this research. The author proposes the following hypothesis: 
In terms of the competences attributed, the Commission has 
adopted an interventionist approach and acts ultra vires with regard 
to the investments in the EU natural gas infrastructure expansion 
projects. 
Research is structured in order to answer the following research questions in a 
sequential manner. The conclusion is reached by answering hypothesis, which 
together with research questions encompass different perspectives and 
opportunities for commodity transmission services and service suppliers (being 
active on the cross-border interconnectors at import/export and entry/exit 
points): 
1) Does the EU accord certain third country pipeline services and service 
suppliers less favourable treatment than it accords to like pipeline transport 
services and service suppliers of other third countries pursuant to relevant 
decisions granting infrastructure exemptions to those suppliers? As a 
consequence, whether the EU observes obligations arising under GATS Article 
II:1?  
2) If the congestion in gas transportation infrastructure occurs, what and which 
are the means to address the failing satisfaction of capacity demands from third 
parties?  
3) Is the legal framework of congestion and traffic management in secondary 
legislation sufficient enough to provide the market growth in a long run?  
4) Whether there exist any appropriate and sufficient instruments that are 
capable to demand investments with regard to the capacity expansion in gas 
infrastructure?  
It is essential, in seeking for the proper answer, to consider and view questions 
cumulatively. The author in this research intends to acknowledge and address 
how the mixture of several different areas of the EU law may interact or even 
overlap with each other while seeking for the options of secure energy 
supplies, with a particular emphasis on developments regarding the EU cross-
border energy transmission infrastructure. 
 
1.3. Method and materials 
The present research is conducted in accordance with the traditional legal 
dogmatic method as laid down in, mainly, written primary and secondary 
European legislation and, secondly, the WTO provisions on services. A 
particular focus is placed on the consistently developing EU energy law in 
order to affirm or reject the hypothesis and answer the proposed research 
questions, which are shaped by the legal method used. The author bases his 
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arguments on the current positive law (lex lata), with an insight of historical 
progress and with a prospective view on the future developments (lex ferenda). 
In essence, the author pursues an argumentation where he leaves also a room 
for external perspectives from beyond the current [positive] law to be 
scrutinised and research does not merely attach to the textual analysis and the 
prevailing legal reasoning.17 The central subject of the research remains a non-
EU natural gas company, which is willing to invest in crucial parts of the cross-
border transmission pipelines i.e. cross-border interconnectors. Research uses 
descriptive approach only where necessary in order to present the specificities 
and technicalities of the topic in a more elaborated manner. Since research 
paper is within the legal discipline, the author conducts a legal analysis. 
From the perspective of the EU legal system, the author interprets legal 
provisions in light of the purpose, values, legal, social and economical goals 
that these provisions aim to achieve, being an equivalent method to teleological 
interpretation as utilised by the CJEU and which is highly crucial in the EU 
legal order.18 Therefore, when conducting analysis in light of teleological 
interpretation, the author puts emphasis on the EU legal order in its entirety 
and also when considering teleological interpretation of a single legal provision 
in accordance with criteria found in CILFIT case.19 
While adopting comparative law method, the author compares the EU law 
against the WTO provisions on services as regards the transportation services 
and supplies of natural gas from the perspective of the EU energy acquis so that 
the EU law provision becomes clarified. The author seeks to develop a 
coherent and consistent analysis of cross-border energy investments in the area 
covered by the EU energy law. Legal analysis is undertaken in order to create a 
streamlining system where primary element is the market player in the EU 
natural gas markets on the transmission level – investor in cross-border 
capacity and the corresponding decision making process. This research stands 
at the crossroad of the external dimension as it involves the treatment of 
agreements with third countries. 
In the first part research concerns the progress related to the EU external 
energy policy under the perspective of security of supply, including also 
extensive efforts to diversify external sources of gas supply. While analysing 
the conflicting underlying values of the EU external energy dimension and the 
preservation of internal energy market, the author also takes into account in his 
analysis the systematic interpretation, which checks the consistency in 
understanding the exemption regime under secondary law against the wording 
of primary competition law, i.e. Art.36 of Directive 2009/73/EC versus 
Art.102(b) TFEU. The primary law in this research is narrowed down to the 
essential facilities doctrine and the relatively new abuse of strategic 
underinvestment. Such a comparison between primary and secondary law is 
necessary in order to select such a meaning of the norm, which corresponds 
and is consistent with other legal norms i.e. Art.35 of Directive 2009/73/EC 
                                                
17 McCrudden, Christopher, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences”, L.Q. Rev., Vol. 122, 
Issue 4 (2006): 632-650, at pp. 633-635. 
18 Poiares, Miguel, Maduro, “Interpreting European Law - Judicial Adjudication in a Context of 
Constitutional Pluralism”, (2008) Working Paper IE Law School (WPLS08-02), at pp. 3-4. 
Accessed August 5, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1134503. 
19 Case C-283/81 CILFIT, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, para. 20. 
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and the overall EU energy strategy, and fits in the EU legal framework to the 
greatest possible extent.  
In order to affirm or reject the hypothesis and answer the related research 
questions, the author performs analysis on the basis of the following legal 
instruments: international law and conventions, the WTO law, the EU primary 
law (founding Treaties of the European Union), jurisprudence of the CJEU, 
the Commission’s commitment decisions, the EU legislative proposals and 
preparatory law (used in order to completement and strengthen the legal 
analysis), secondary legislation (relevant regulations, directives and the 
Commission’s decisions), scholarly writings - where the author intends to 
provide insights on the inter-linkage between law and the rationality of 
economics, which, nevertheless, is limited to qualitative analysis only. 
However, in order to make any proposals for improvements of the existing 
legal setup for boosting up investments, the author aims to provide the reader 
with a comprehensive and solid analysis regarding the indivisible nexus of the 
EU external trade, the EU internal actions and development of the EU energy 
policy in general. Hence, research consists of two inter-linked parts. Whereas 
the first part covers the relevant framework of the EU energy policy in order 
for the second part to be more substantiated. When determining “what the 
[EU] law is”, the author adopts a balancing exercise of legal provisions 
allowing exchange of ideas to emerge.20 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
TEP in this research is invoked only when analysing the substantive provisions 
of Directive 2009/73/EC and the corresponding acts of regulatory authorities, 
either on the national or supra-national level. Without prejudice to the 
geopolitical context, among other trending topics, such as ownership 
unbundling, the author chooses to focus on the principle of TPA only. The 
author does not go into in-depth sector specific technical specificities, but 
chooses rather to emphasise certain notions to make them more 
comprehensible to the reader in the course of making the subject matter more 
elaborated. 
This research has no intention to provide a broad and overly comprehensive 
development of regulation of the EU internal natural gas markets. Instead it 
takes into consideration the evolving idea of State of the Energy Union and the 
increasing importance of security of gas supply.21 The EU internal and external 
energy policies are evaluated and considered as to provide the reader with an 
understanding whether both of them can come across each other (also in a 
historical prospect) and how far the EU energy acquis is able to reach - with 
                                                
20 Guttierrez-Fons, A. Jose, and Lenaerts, Koen, “To Say What the Law of the EU is: Methods 
of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice”, Colum. J. Eur. L., Vol. 20, Issue 2 (2014): 
3-61, at p. 61. 
21 Communication from the Commission, “State of the Energy Union 2015”. [2015] COM 572 
final. Accessed August 12, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0572. 
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PCA as the primary example. Thus, this research distinguishes the ability and 
incentives of Member States themselves to enter into mutual relations with 
third countries concerning the field of energy. 
By stressing the aspects of GATS to be applied for the market player’s 
operations within the Union, the underlying analysis switches to the market 
player who is willing to invest. But still, from the perspective of company from 
a non-EU country, decisions related to the strategic underinvestment, the 
refusal to deal, and exemptions are chosen in a manner best fit for the purpose. 
However, in terms of essential facilities doctrine, the author does not provide 
approach adopted by the United States on this matter and in the same way 
does not refer to the common law antitrust legislation or jurisprudence. The 
doctrine itself is far more legally recognised in the United States than in the 
EU. Furthermore, the essential discussion wraps around the legal certainty 
seeking market player, which is capable to foreclose the downstream gas 
markets by means of innovation. Overall, research focuses on the 
establishment of a perfect mix of regulatory framework and the prospective 
insight in future anticipations, where the legitimate expectations and legal 
certainty of market players from third country (-ies) are observed. 
 
1.5. Outline 
The first Chapter introduces reader with the peculiarities and practicalities of 
the subject, while hypothesis and research questions are proposed.  
Chapter II provides an assessment and timeline of the CJEU rulings regarding 
the EU internal and external actions and how the shared competence fits with 
them. Chapter III looks at the competence in more detail and with full regard 
to the EU energy policy, while establishing the role of parties involved.  
In Chapter IV the realms of the EU law and the WTO law are contrasted 
concerning the freedom to provide services, while leading the reader to the 
major analysis on midstream pipelines.  
In Chapter V the author provides a detailed evaluation and search for 
loopholes with respect to the Commission’s steps adopted in its reasoning in 
granting exemptions. In Chapter VI a similar approach to Chapter V is 
pursued, but in the context of unilateral conduct - both are counterbalanced. 
This section seeks for the available remedies for investors, supra-national 
institutions, market and, at the end of the day, how to bind them altogether. 
Chapter VII makes an immense effort to provide a reasoned answer to 
hypothesis, the corresponding research questions regarding the treatment of 
capacities and investments in crucial parts of the EU energy infrastructure by 
summarising the previous six chapters. 
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2. The development of shared competence 
Art.4(2)(i) TFEU distinguishes that the Union and the Member States share 
competence and powers in the sphere of energy and both are authorised to 
adopt binding acts in this field. In terms of the EU external energy policy, it is 
accepted that the complex case law on competences, since the adoption of 
Lisbon Treaty, is now envisaged in the new Art.216 TFEU.22 In compliance 
with Art.2(2) TFEU, Protocol 25, on the exercise of shared competence, of the 
Lisbon Treaty explicitly establishes that: 
 “[…] when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of 
this exercise of competence only covers those elements governed by the 
Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area.” 
By such a provision the legislature intends to specify the power of the Union in 
terms of shared competence. Namely, if the EU provides an approved legal act 
to the Union, it has an enforceable authority by the Union within the scope of 
the act itself. Hence, the only option for the EU, concerning the expansion of 
its competence, is an establishment and implementation of new legislation in 
new areas and fields respectively. Some scholars suggest that “mixity” will 
therefore remain relevant in external energy policy – persuading Member States 
to act together on matters of external energy security.23 
With regard to the incorporation of international law in the EU law, Art.216(2) 
TFEU provides that “[international] agreements concluded by the Union are 
binding upon the institutions” and, consequently, they prevail over acts of the 
Union and its Member States, so that such agreements enjoy supra-legislative 
status. Nevertheless, the CJEU in Kadi I imposed limits to international 
agreements. Such international agreements cannot have an adverse effect on 
the constitutional principles of the Treaties – constitutional framework upon 
which the Union is founded.24  The CJEU in Kadi I case elaborated on a 
principle that international treaty shall not affect the autonomy of the EU legal 
order.25 Moreover, obligations stemming from such a treaty could not prevent 
secondary legislation, which implements a UN Security Council Resolution, for 
being exempted from judicial review under the EU law.26 Accordingly, it is of 
paramount constitutional importance that acts adopted by the EU “must 
respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their 
lawfulness”, whereas the CJEU is the only supra-national entity, which has a 
right to “review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies 
established by the Treaty”.27 
                                                
22 Art.216(1) TFEU provides that “the Union may conclude an agreement if, inter alia, the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve within the framework of the 
Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties”. 
23 Hancher, Leigh, and Salerno M., Francesco. “Energy Policy after Lisbon” in EU Law after 
Lisbon, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, at p. 398. 
24 Joined Cases C-402/05P and 415/05P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission (Kadi I), ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 285. 
25 Ibid, para. 282. 
26 Ibid, para. 285.  
27 Ibid. 
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Although, in contrast to Kadi I, where the autonomy of the EU legal order 
(including the protection of EU core values) was emphasised, in more recent 
case Air Transport Association of America the CJEU engaged in establishing the 
requirements under which international law actually binds the EU. The CJEU 
also distinguished the circumstances under which it undertakes to review acts 
established by the EU in the light of international law - whether international 
treaties or principles of customary law.28 Namely, the CJEU determined a set 
of conditions by which it recognised the need to address conflicts between the 
provisions of the EU and international law.29 In terms of divergence, Kadi I 
differs from case Air Transport Association of America by that the former did not 
perform an analysis on whether principles under scrutiny are recognised as 
being elements of customary international law and, if so, whether and to what 
extent the individuals have a possibility to rely on such principles.30 
It becomes clear that international agreement, which has a detrimental effect 
on the EU constitutional principles, cannot form part and integrate in the EU 
legal order.31 On the other hand, the CJEU also tries to find a dialogue and 
reconcile the relationship between the legal norms of different, but also 
complementary legal systems.32 International law then has a potential to 
provide valuable guidance when determining the objectives followed by the 
secondary EU legislation implementing international obligations, which, 
however, are binding upon the EU. Indeed, when pursuing such approach, the 
EU law is then, by definition, open to the external influence of international 
legal standards. This is what actually characterises closed nature of the internal 
market. Similarly, it is presumed that Art.216(1) TFEU detects a 
constitutionalisation of the doctrine of implied powers,33 whereas the CJEU 
acts as an establishing entity of such a principle.34 The Lisbon Treaty has also 
expanded the possibilities for the use of both implied powers and the flexibility 
clause as provided in Art.352 TFEU by loosening the link between internal 
objectives and external actions.35  
The general guidelines for the liberalisation of internal natural gas market are 
prescribed in Art.194(1) TFEU. It is understood that they aim to ensure 
security of energy supply and promote the interconnection of energy networks 
within the Union.36 Moreover, Art.194(2) TFEU states that the competence 
                                                
28 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, para. 101. The EU 
has a strict obligation to comply and contribute to the development of international law, which 
binds the EU institutions. 
29 Ibid, paras. 102-110 and paras. 121-130. 
30 Mauricio, Ana Julia, “Relationship between European Union Law and International Law 
through the Prism of the Court of Justice’s ETS Judgement: Revisiting Kadi I”, King’s Student 
Law Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2012): 65-77, at p. 75. 
31 Supra note 20, at pp. 40-41. 
32 Supra note 30, at p. 76. 
33 Klamert, Marcus. The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
at p. 159. 
34 Cremona, Marise,  “External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: 
The Emergence of an Integrated Policy” in The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, at p. 226. 
35 Ibid. 
36 ENTSO-G. “The European Natural Gas Network 2016. Capacities at Cross-Border Points 
on the Primary Market.” (2016) (Transmission Capacity Map). Accessed August 22, 2016. 
http://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/maps/transmissioncapacity/2016/ENTSOG_C
AP_MAY2016_A0FORMAT.pdf. 
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shall not affect the choice of Member States regarding energy sources and the 
general structure of the overall energy supply. Art.192(2)(c) TFEU, 
nevertheless, provides that such particular choices by Member States shall not 
undermine decisions adopted by the Council, which aims to implement “[…] 
measures significantly affecting choice of Member States between different 
energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply”. Indeed, it is 
clear that supra-national institutions of the EU have a right to intervene into 
matters related to the energy sources and supplies if they are capable to affect a 
part of the internal market.  
The Commission, with its proposal for a new security of supply regulation and 
in terms of cooperation with Member States, proposes, inter alia, a shift from 
national approach to regional approach when adopting measures related to 
security of supply, thus making such measures more effective. What concerns 
the relationship between Member States and natural gas companies, the new 
regulation requires a joint action on the construction of bi-directional capacity 
(reverse flows) at each particular interconnection point as such decisions can 
no longer be taken unilaterally. Moreover, other Member States, even those 
only potentially concerned, along the supply corridor, in the decision, should 
be invited to participate in the implementation of construction projects. ACER 
will then scrutinise the joint decision and the Commission has an option to 
adopt a decision requesting amendments to joint decision.37 The new 
regulation, thus, corresponds more closely the wording of Art.194 TFEU 
regarding the notion of “cooperation”. Therefore, it is relevant to ascertain the 
development of shared competence over the years and also analyse the 
international implications regarding the EU external energy dimension, as the 
former cannot be viewed in a complete isolation. 
 
2.1. Opinion 2/91 
According to the CJEU, the scope of the common rules may be affected or 
distorted by the international commitments when they fall within the scope of 
common rules38 or in any event “within an area which is already largely covered 
by such rules”.39 The latter scenario is envisaged in Opinion 2/91 and it makes 
the Union to possess an exclusive competence. Even if there is no possible 
contradiction between international commitments and the common EU rules, 
Member States shall not enter into such commitments outside the framework 
of the Union institutions.40 This assumption is valid where, in terms of close 
cooperation, the subject mater of an agreement or convention falls partly 
within the competence of the Union and in part within that of Member 
                                                
37 European Commission. “Fact Sheet: Security of gas supply regulation.” (February 2016). 
Accessed August 3, 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-308_lv.htm. 
38 Case C-22/70 Commission v Council (AETR), ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, para. 30. (Commission v 
Council (AETR)). 
39 Opinion 2/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para. 10. (Opinion 2/91). 
40 Ibid, paras. 25-26. The [international] commitments arising from that part of Convention 
No.170, which fall within the area covered by the secondary Union legislation, are of such a 
type as to affect the Union rules (laid down in that particular EU secondary legislation). 
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States.41 This is also the case in Opinion 2/91, where the conclusion of 
Convention No. 17042 was a matter standing within the joint competence of 
Member States and the Union.43 
M. Klamert, for instance, argues that the “formula” of Opinion 2/91 has never 
been fulfilled to establish exclusive competence, but the CJEU has rather relied 
on this principle in order to establish jurisdiction for the interpretation of 
mixed agreements.44 He also adds that principle elaborated in Opinion 2/91 is 
absent in the current Art.3(2) TFEU.45 In turn, it has to be understood that 
Opinion 2/91 has developed a more coherent doctrine of shared competence. 
The duty of cooperation between Member States and the Union must apply as 
it is of high importance for “the unity in the international representation of the 
Union”. Whereas such a duty applies in the process of negotiations of mixed 
agreement, its conclusion and in the subsequent fulfilment of the obligations 
entered into,46 as well as including its ratification.47 
It can be derived from Opinion 2/91 that the Member State has a right to 
introduce or maintain more stringent measures for the protection of certain 
[working] conditions, which, nevertheless, shall comply with the Treaty.48 The 
CJEU ruled that “the Union enjoys an internal legislative competence in the 
area [of social policy]”49 even in a situation when it was for Member States, not 
the Union, to encourage improvements in health and safety as prescribed in 
the Treaty. The Union’s competence at that time was only subsidiary.  
As discussed beforehand, the CJEU had to elaborate on a point where the 
international agreement covers the same subject matter as the Union legislation 
and both allow for the adoption of more stringent provisions (while both - the 
EU law and the ILO Convention laid down minimum standards only).50 It is 
understood that essence of the reasoning has to be interpreted so as to 
encompass that “where the agreement covers the same subject matter as the 
Union legislation, the Union needs to negotiate so as to avoid conflict, or, 
alternatively, so as to be persuaded that new rules need to be adopted at 
international level, which may require the amendment of the existing EU 
legislation”.51 While under the ILO Constitution the Union is not itself allowed 
                                                
41 Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty Improving 
functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy (study for the AFCO Committee)”, 
(2016) PE 556.952, at p. 15. 
42 International Labour Organization, “C-170  - Chemicals  Convention, 1990 (No .170) (Convention 
concerning Safety in the use of Chemicals at Work)” as entered into force on November 4, 1993. 
Accessed August 7, 2016. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrumen
t_id:312315. 
43 Opinion 2/91, para. 15. Therefore, that the EU rules covered broadly the same subject matter 
it was a sufficient ground to exclude the need for any conflict between provisions of the 
Convention and those of the Union secondary legislation. 
44 Supra note 33, at p. 155. 
45 Ibid, at p. 157. 
46 Opinion 1/94, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para. 109. (Opinion 1/94). 
47 Opinion 2/91, para.38. 
48 Ibid, para. 16. 
49 Opinion 2/91, para.17. 
50 Ibid, para. 18. 
51 Eeckhout, Piet, EU External Relations Law (2nd edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011, at p. 86. 
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to conclude Convention No. 170, the CJEU provided that the Union’s external 
competence may, if necessary, be exercised through Member States acting 
jointly in the interest of the Union.52 Such an implied flexibility grants a 
competence for the EU and forms the legal basis to exercise EU external 
powers on which the Union itself is eligible to conclude the energy 
interdependence clauses.53 
 
2.2. C-459/03 Mox Plant 
In terms of international agreements and the status of mixed agreements in the 
EU legal order, the CJEU decided that Ireland was in a breach of the duty of 
sincere cooperation by instituting dispute settlement proceedings against the 
United Kingdom to a tribunal under UNCLOS, rather than before the CJEU, 
in relation to matters, which fell within the EU competence (interpretation of 
the EU law) without prior consultations with the Commission. Namely, a 
breach of such nature “involves a manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid 
down in the Treaties and consequently the autonomy of the Union legal system 
may be adversely affected”.54 
This case prescribes division of competences between the Union and its 
Member States as the reasoning explicitly establishes that “the question as to 
whether a provision of a mixed agreement comes within the competence of the 
Union is one which relates to the attribution and, thus, the very existence of 
that competence, and not to its exclusive or shared nature.”55 Hence, it could 
be derived that a provision of a mixed agreement comes within the scope of 
the competence of the EU, as soon as the crucial provision does not fall purely 
within the exclusive competence of Member States. This will depend solely on 
existence of the EU external competence, but it will not depend on whether or 
not the EU has exercised its competence by adopting secondary legislation in 
such a particular policy field.56 To be more precise, the CJEU in Mox Plant case 
also established a principle that in the field of mixed agreements the Member 
State has a positive duty to inform and consult the respective institutions of the 
Union before an individual action is undertaken by the Member State.57 It was 
also relevant “whether and to what extent the Union, by becoming a party to 
an international Convention”, enabled itself to exercise its external shared 
competence (concerning the protection of environment).58 
                                                
52 Koutrakos, Panos, EU International Relations Law, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015, at p. 196. 
53 Vooren, van Bart. “EU External Energy Policy: The Legal and Policy Impact of the New 
Competence” in The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2012, at p. 299. Similarly, Opinion 2/91 para.11 prescribes that the Union interests 
would be negatively affected if Member States would have a right to enter into international 
agreements capable of affecting EU rules already adopted in areas falling outside common 
policies or of altering their scope. 
54 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, para. 154. (Mox Plant). 
55 Ibid, para. 93. 
56 Schrijver, Nico, “Case C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006”, Common Market L. Rev., Vol. 47, 
Issue 3 (2010): 863-878, at p. 873. 
57 Mox Plant, para.179. 
58 Mox Plant, para.95-96. 
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2.3. C-308/06 Intertanko 
In Intertanko case the CJEU established that the invalidity of secondary Union 
legislation could not be assessed by reference to either international agreement 
due to two reasons prescribed further. First of all, the CJEU adopted such 
reasoning because the Union was not bound by and party to MARPOL, while 
Member States were at that time.59 Secondly, the assessment could not be made 
because of the overall nature of UNCLOS, which, nevertheless, lacks the direct 
effect.60 In other words, the CJEU did not emphasise and review the Union 
law in light of binding international law and the related obligations, but took 
account of the obligations of Member States and associated its reasoning with 
the principles of international law. 
On the one hand, Intertanko case sees the conferral of rights on individuals as a 
crucial criterion61 while, on the other hand, in another case the CJEU has 
decided that “even if the convention (here on biological diversity) contains 
provisions, which do not have direct effect, that fact does not preclude review 
by the courts of compliance with the obligations incumbent on the Union as a 
party to that agreement.”62 This requires further clarification concerning the 
issue as to whether international agreements need to confer rights upon 
individuals in order to be directly effective. Generally, the CJEU widely accepts 
that international agreements (with the exception of the WTO agreements) 
have direct effect within the EU legal order. 
In order to establish the direct effect, CJEU applies a two-step test:  
“the CJEU can examine the validity of the Union legislation in 
the light of an international treaty only where the nature and the 
broad logic of the latter do not preclude this and, additionally, 
the Treaty’s provisions appear, as regards their content, to be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise.”63  
Hence, in some cases the CJEU denies the direct effect of individual 
provisions of such agreements because of their lack of precision or 
unconditionality, and the CJEU only denies the direct effect on the basis of the 
“nature and the broad logic” of the agreement in the case of the WTO and also 
of the UNCLOS.64 It implies that there is a difference between the ordinary 
EU free trade and association agreements on the one side and the WTO 
agreements on the other.  
                                                
59 Case C-308/06 Intertanko, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, para. 52. (Intertanko). 
60 Eeckhout, Piet, “Case C-308/06 the Queen on the Application of Intertanko and Others v 
Secretary of State for Transport, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 3 June 
2008”, Common Market L. Rev., Vol. 46, Issue 6 (2009): 2041-2058, at p. 2053 et seq. 
61 Intertanko, paras. 59-64. General view is that the CJEU examines legality of the EU law in 
light of the WTO rules only if the EU legislation intends to implement a particular WTO 
provision. For the reasoning see Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council. 
62 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523, para. 54.  
63 Intertanko, para. 45. 
64 Intertanko, paras. 53-66. 
 17 
As regards the WTO, the CJEU has explicitly referred to the reciprocity and 
mutual advantageousness of the provisions.65 Secondly, another influencing 
factor is the procedure under which the question is raised (i.e. actions for 
annulment by Member States, infringement proceedings against Member States 
or cases involving individuals). In fact, it is acknowledged that secondary 
legislation, by violating the primary EU law or international agreements, may 
give rise to non-contractual liability. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
violations of international agreements concluded by the EU, a pre-condition is 
that the agreement is considered to have direct effect and that it does not fall 
under the “WTO exception” of the doctrine of direct effect.66 Thus, as 
distinguished in Intertanko, international agreements concluded by the Union 
have primacy over the secondary Union legislation. 
 
2.4. C-45/07 Commission v Greece 
Essentially, in terms of division of powers between the EU and its Member 
States, the CJEU ruled that Member State, by submitting to the IMO a 
proposal for monitoring the compliance of ships and port facilities with certain 
requirements of the international convention (for the Safety of Life at Sea), had 
failed to fulfil its obligations under the duty of sincere cooperation. Therefore, 
the mere initiation of a procedure that might have led the IMO to adopt a new 
rule that would have interfered with the EU rules (Regulation No. 725/2004 
on enhancing ship and port facility security) was a sufficient ground for the 
CJEU to conclude that the proposal submitted by Member State amounted to 
an illegitimate exercise by the latter of an exclusive EU competence. In this 
case the CJEU clarified the obligations arising for Member State from the duty 
of sincere cooperation for the implementation of an international agreement.67 
It could be argued that the duty of sincere cooperation is particularly relevant 
where, as in this case, the EU is not a party to international agreement and 
Member States act jointly in the interests of the EU.68 Nevertheless, even in a 
field of shared competence (such as the negotiation of a mixed environmental 
agreement) the CJEU has ruled that Member States are under a specific duty of 
action and abstention once the Commission has initiated an action in that 
area.69 For instance, the CJEU decided that Member State had violated the 
obligation of sincere cooperation and thus weakened the EU’s unity and 
negotiating stance by its unilateral proposal to a list of a particular substance 
                                                
65 Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574, para.42. (Portugal v Council). Including 
also political reasons e.g. the room for negotiations and the denial of direct effect of the WTO 
law by major EU trading partners. 
66 Herrmann, Christoph, “The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the 
Emerging EU Investment Policy”, J. World Investment & Trade, Vol. 15, Issue 3-4 (2014): 570-
584, at pp. 577-579. 
67 Case C-45/07 Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2009:81. 
68 Opinion 2/91, section VI. 
69 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 91. For example, Member 
State has such a duty once the Commission has submitted proposals to the Council, which, 
however, not yet fully adopted by the latter, signifies a starting point for the EU’s common 
strategy. 
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before the EU had time to propose position on that matter, in an area of 
shared competence.70 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 Ibid. 
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3. Post-Lisbon strategy on energy 
An express competence in the sphere of energy was only conferred with the 
Treaty of Lisbon entry into force.71 With regard to the energy sector, prior to 
the Lisbon Treaty as the relevant legal bases for the promotion of competition 
was used e.g. Art. 102 TFEU. In fact, most of the legislative documents then 
were adopted on the basis of the approximation of laws/internal market 
competence (current Art.114 TFEU). Moreover, both provisions usually were 
used in combination with other legal bases where necessary - e.g. environment 
(Art.191 TFEU).72 It is clear that prior to the Lisbon regime the legal basis for 
energy was rather fragmented. Indeed, the evolving nature of such a field of 
policy requires to be assigned under a more concrete Treaty provision. 
Directive 2009/73/EC already prescribes a duty for entities, which are in the 
process of planning projects and during the planning phase of such projects, to 
evaluate and test the positive effects of exempted infrastructure projects with 
regard to competition, security of supply and the likely market interest, 
including a positive duty to implement the rules on congestion management. 
Moreover, whereas the location of infrastructure concerns more than one 
Member State, ACER should “handle as a last resort” the infrastructure 
exemption request in order to facilitate its administrative handling, as well as its 
cross-border implications.73 Directive 2009/73/EC also establishes  “the 
possibility of temporary derogations for security of supply reasons only, in 
particular, to new pipelines within the Union transporting gas from third 
countries into the Union”.74 
 
3.1. Competence to act and its implications 
In essence, there is no expressly defined external competence to act in the field 
of energy attributed to the Union in Art.194 TFEU, but the power is rather 
shared (Art.4(2) TFEU). Indeed, second indent of Art.194(2) TFEU, however, 
provides that Member States remain competent to conclude international 
agreements that relate to the composition of their energy mix, and that they 
could not be pre-empted by any EU internal action from doing so. However, 
such a divergent action indicates that there could possibly exist diverse energy 
mixes across different Member States. Thus, Member States have two options 
– either to upload their interests to the EU internal and external energy policy; 
or they may pursue their own national interests with disregard for the common 
                                                
71 Peeters, Marjan, “Governing Towards Renewable Energy in the EU: Competences, 
Instruments and Procedures”, Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L., Vol. 21, Issue 1 (2014): 39-63, at 
pp. 43-44. As M. Peeters suggests, rights under Art. 194 TFEU can be exercised only if they do 
not adversely affect other parts of the Union law. 
72 Fisher, E. et al., Environmental Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, at pp. 131-133. 
73 Directive 2009/73/EC, recital 35. 
74 Ibid. 
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EU interest. The worst scenario is that Member States would act individually 
with a result of diverse policies towards the major exporting countries.75 
Similarly, it may be considered that the Union’s competence is limited to the 
four internal aspects prescribed in Art.194 TFEU and thus energy policy is 
constrained to the internal market only – i.e. free movement of goods and 
undistorted competition.76 With regard to the supra-national division split of 
competences, the CJEU has distinguished in AETR case that when concluding 
agreements “with one or more third countries or an international organisation, 
such agreements are to be negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the 
Council, subject to any more extensive powers which may have been vested in 
the Commission”.77 
Nevertheless, by adopting such a decision in AETR, the CJEU was aware that 
the relevant internal measures could not be separated from the external 
relations.78 As discussed, the CJEU envisages a need for the external unity in 
order to safeguard legislative processes internally. Hence, any external actions 
of the EU require that they are implied from internal rules adopted by the 
Union, and as a consequence Member States will be pre-empted from acting. 
When a matter concerns the subject of a common policy, Member States are 
bound in every case to act jointly to defend and fulfil the Union’s interests.79 
For example, M. Cremona argues that such a developed external unity assists 
as a safeguard for the framework of internal policy, while the mutual trust and 
reciprocity that emerge in the process of structuring of a certain and specific 
internal policy provides the ground for the transfer of powers necessary in 
achieving external unity.80 In essence, the exercise by the Union of a shared 
competence in a certain sphere of law has a potential to trigger AETR 
principle (e.g. when the Union concludes international agreement, which is 
within the ambit of shared competence). 
Similarly, the TEP (based on Art.114 TFEU) emphasises that the Union 
already enjoys quite extensive competence in the area of energy policy. Indeed, 
even if TEP does not give institutions of the Union the necessary power to 
require a particular investment or to require Member States to promote a 
particular cross-border infrastructure per se, it enables the Commission, 
nonetheless, to influence national energy choices to a considerable extent. 
Moreover, as will be further shown, TEP introduces a shift in the balance of 
competences between the European, national and regional levels.81 Hence, on 
several matters at least, Member States have lost relevant powers and 
opportunities to move forward with further inter-governmental and ad hoc 
arrangements on the regional energy market level.82  
                                                
75 Wessel A., Ramses, Bart Van Vooren. EU External Relations law: Text, Cases and Materials. 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, at p. 445. 
76 Supra note 23, at p. 397. 
77 Commission v Council (AETR), para. 75. 
78 Commission v Council (AETR), paras. 54-55. 
79 Commission v Council (AETR), para. 77. 
80 Cremona, Marise. “EU External Relations: Unity and Conferral of Powers”, in The Question of 
Competence in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, at p. 67. 
81 Aalto, Pami and Temel K. Dickle, “European Energy Security: Natural Gas and the 
Integration Process”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, Issue 4 (2014): 758-774, at p. 
762. 
82 Supra note 23, at p. 375. 
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Besides, Art.58 of PCA, regarding investment promotion and protection, 
explicitly establishes that the respective competences and powers of Member 
States and the Union already in place should not be affected in an adverse 
manner. Namely, “the cooperation shall aim to establish a favourable climate 
for investment, both domestic and foreign, especially via better conditions for 
investment protection […]”. In addition and also with regard to investment, 
Art.58(2) of PCA then goes to emphasise that cooperation shall be also aimed 
to the conclusion “where appropriate, between the Member States and Russia 
agreements for the promotion and protection of investment” as well as to 
“exchange information on laws, regulations and administrative practices” in 
that field. This implies that PCA is not construed as to impose conditions (and 
to have legal relationships), which could have an adverse impact on the 
structure of EU decisional formation and the unity of internal market as such.   
 
3.2. Mechanisms for the promotion of energy 
investment and trade 
The EU has adopted an information exchange mechanism in Decision No. 
994/2012 (covering only agreements concluded with third countries), which 
requires Member States to inform the Commission about their 
intergovernmental agreements with third countries having an impact on the 
internal energy market and on the security of energy supply in the Union. In 
turn, the Commission has a right to assess the compatibility of those 
agreements with the EU law requirements and, if necessary, provide advice on 
how to solve the identified problems.83 Therefore, this mechanism can be 
considered as a preventive instrument aiming to avoid conflicts between the 
EU and international law, including the resulting commitments provided by 
Member States. 
Nevertheless, the information disclosure requirement is related only to legally 
binding agreements and it is specifically designed for Member States 
themselves to decide whether or not a particular intergovernmental agreement 
with a third country has an impact on the energy market of the EU.84 It is 
noteworthy that the preamble of Decision No. 994/2012 explicitly 
distinguishes that “the information exchange mechanism, including 
assessments to be made by Member States in implementing it, is without 
prejudice to the application of the Union rule on infringements, state aid and 
competition.”85 Similarly, Decision has to be considered as a widened version 
of Art.13(6)(a) of Regulation No. 994/2010, which requires that 
intergovernmental agreements, which have “an impact on the development of 
gas infrastructure and gas supplies” be communicated. It has to be presumed 
                                                
83 Decision No. 994/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental 
agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy, 27 October 
2012, OJ L 299, recital 17. 
84 Elsuwege van Peter. “The EU’s governance of external energy relations: the challenges of a 
rule-based market approach” in The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, at p. 226. 
85 Supra note 83, recital 19. 
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that both legal institutes are complementary to each other, as agreements 
submitted under Regulation No. 994/2010 are considered being submitted for 
the purposes of Decision No. 994/2012.86 
Regulation No. 994/2010, based on Art.194(2) TFEU, however, envisages the 
shared responsibility to ensure the security of supply, which is placed on 
natural gas undertakings, the Commission and the competent authorities of 
respective Member States.87 Moreover, Directive 2009/73/EC also establishes 
that security of supply shall be assessed in light of the factual circumstances of 
each situation, including the rights and obligations stemming from 
international law i.e. international agreements between the Union and the third 
countries concerned.88 The Commission therefore assists (and is encouraged), 
where appropriate, in submitting recommendations to negotiate relevant 
agreements with third countries, addressing the security of energy supply to the 
Union or to include the (necessary) issues in other negotiations with those 
third countries.89 
Pursuant to Art.3(2) of Decision No. 994/2012, the scope of assessment 
prescribed in the provision is not defined further, and neither are its legal 
consequences. Namely, the compatibility check will mostly look at the rules on 
competition and internal market, which thus means that beyond a legality 
assessment there may also be a policy-oriented assessment focusing on the 
security of supply of the EU, which would be in line with Art.194(1) TFEU. 
However, the potential impact or role of this check by the Commission, 
concerning the infringement proceedings arising in future, is left open by the 
Decision.  
Similarly, there is no clear guidance provided what type of action has to be 
invoked if the Commission finds incompatibility with the security of supply.90 
For instance, in terms of Art.3(2), discussions under Art.7(d) of Decision No. 
994/2012 could be triggered as the “Commission shall facilitate coordination 
among Member States with a view to supporting the development of 
multilateral intergovernmental agreements involving several Member States or 
the Union as a whole”. If the current intergovernmental agreements were 
found to violate objectives of the EU energy policy, in terms of legal violation, 
is it possible for this mechanism then be used to trigger their replacement by 
the EU and Member State mixed energy agreements with the specific third 
country?91 Art.194 TFEU and Decision No. 994/2012, both jointly, is a 
                                                
86 Supra note 75, at p. 467. Following this communication, the Commission checks the 
agreement, and informs the Member State if there may be a problem. 
87 As it is defined in Art.2(2) of Regulation No. 994/2010, as opposed to NRAs, and the 
ACER who only need to be consulted in certain matters (see Article 3 in relation to 
responsibility for security of gas supply) and Article 4 (establishment of a preventive action and 
an emergency plan). 
88 Directive 2009/73/EC, recital 22. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Communication from the Commission, “The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners 
beyond Our Borders”. [2011] COM 539 final. Accessed August 18, 2016. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0539. One of the 
objectives is to strengthen partnerships for secure, safe, sustainable and competitive energy, as 
well as pursue a better promotion of EU policies beyond its borders with a) market integration 
partners, b) key energy suppliers and transit countries, c) key energy players worldwide. 
91 Supra note 75, at p. 468. It is certain that Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy sees 
Decision No. 994/2012 as an instrument potentially leading such international agreements 
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developing and expanding legal setup to enable Member States to get along 
with the EU external energy policy.  
However, there might be a future friction between the EU and international 
law in respect of intergovernmental agreements in the field of energy, which 
Commission finds incompatible with the EU law. In practice, to remedy such a 
friction, the Commission suggests to be involved before Member State and a 
third country conclude such problematic agreements (as opposed to the 
current compliance checks of intergovernmental agreements under Decision 
No. 994/2012 after Member State and a third country have concluded such 
agreements).92 This change indicates a shift of tasks from Member States to the 
EU. Moreover, this is achieved by using Art.5 TFEU on subsidiarity as a legal 
ground to ensure compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU 
law and to create legal certainty. In terms of the EU action, the Commission 
itself insists that such an intervention qualifies as  “an essential added value for 
resolving conflicts between Member States under international treaty law and 
the EU law.”93 The Energy Union Strategy emphasises this point that the re-
negotiation of such agreements is highly complicated due to the already fixed 
positions of the signatories, which, in turn, exerts additional (political) pressure 
not to change any aspect of the agreement in question.94 
 
                                                                                                                        
being concluded by the Union. See for explanation 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/international-cooperation/intergovernmental-
agreements. 
92 Commission’s proposal for a decision, “on establishing an information exchange mechanism 
with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member 
States and third countries in the field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU”. 
[2016]  2016/31 (COD), COM 53 final, at p. 2. 
93 Ibid, at pp. 3-4. 
94 Supra note 13. 
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4. Energy transportation: between the 
WTO and the EU legal orders 
The Lisbon Treaty has drawn a clear distinction between the obligation to 
establish free trade within the Union and the objective of gradually liberalising 
trade with third countries.95 On the other hand, the broad scope and the 
extensive reach of GATS extend to measures concerning imports of 
commodity in so far as they affect suppliers of wholesale trade services. Such a 
broad scope of GATS is designed to capture all forms of service supply. 
Therefore, it is hard to conceive of any regulatory measure on the part of the 
EU law, which does not affect the supply of service, as covered by GATS.96 
Nonetheless, the Union and Member States retained shared competence in the 
conclusion of GATS.97 In terms of the CJEU, there is no indication that the 
“right to trade”98 is extended to a right for the third country commodity 
entering or leaving the Union. At the same time, third country entities 
operating in the internal market and seeking an exemption for the energy 
infrastructure have to manoeuvre through two legal orders in order to 
acknowledge and comply with the most favourable legal framework. However, 
further arguments reveal that such a reliance on two different legal regimes, for 
an entity linked to the supplies of natural gas and conducting operations in the 
Union, might be more complicated as it initially could seem. 
 
4.1. Seeking for direct applicability and the 
available options for service providers 
While Art.216(2) TFEU recognises the binding nature of agreements 
concluded by the Union, the CJEU, in general, has decided that it disallows the 
WTO law as a ground for legal complaint by a provider, which delivers energy 
services.99 The legislator in Decision 94/800/EC100 holds a similar view to the 
                                                
95 Jacobsson, Johanna, “Liberalisation of Service Mobility in the EU’s International Trade 
Agreements: As External as it Gets”, Eur. J. Migration & L., Vol. 15, Issue 3 (2013): 245-262, at 
p. 246. J. Jacobsson suggests that the EU has not completed the internal market as 1) the 
liberalisation of trade in services with third countries is still underperforming and 2) there are 
significant impediments to the circulation of both services and service suppliers with regard to 
the third country nationals (at p. 246). Nevertheless, while the internal market is incomplete, 
the limits are put to the external liberalisation as well – third-country service suppliers cannot 
expect to be offered better treatment than it is already provided by the EU law to service 
suppliers which originate in Member States (at p. 261). 
96 Eeckhout, Piet, “Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services” in The EU and the 
WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002, at p. 231. 
97 Opinion 1/94, paras. 95-98. 
98 Case 240/83 ADBHU, ECLI:EU:C:1985:59. 
99 Portugal v Council, para. 47: “Having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO 
agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the 
legality of measures adopted by the Union institutions.” 
100 Decision 94/800 of December 22, 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the 
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in 
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CJEU that the “agreement establishing the WTO […] is not susceptible to 
being directly invoked in the courts of the Union and its Member States per 
se”. On the contrary, Regulation No. 1225/2009 establishes that “the language 
of the [international] agreement should be brought into the Union’s legislation 
as far as possible”.101 Nevertheless, such a language requirement should be 
more elaborated, not as it currently exists - defined in broad and vague terms, 
also being left vulnerable against different interpretations. 
From the perspective of the CJEU, the WTO law can be directly invoked in 
the courts of the Union where the latter intends to 1) “implement a particular 
obligation assumed in the context of WTO agreement” and 2) “where the EU 
act in question refers explicitly to specific provisions of those [international] 
agreements”.102 Such an obvious lack of direct applicability to market players 
makes it impossible for the natural gas entity to mount a legal challenge to the 
Union measure on the basis of the WTO law. Some scholars suggest that the 
matter of direct applicability should rather concern the market players 
themselves, not, nonetheless, that of the Member States.103 
Similarly, it is acknowledged by the CJEU that the Union’s most important 
commercial partners hold a view that the WTO law is not among the rules 
applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of their domestic 
law (non-enforceability of the WTO agreements), thus direct applicability is 
disallowed.104 One might conclude that in the reasoning of the CJEU as such 
there is an explicit reference to the lack of reciprocity if one were to consider 
the applicability of the WTO law. For instance, in LVP case the CJEU decided 
that regulation adopted by the Union cannot be regarded as a measure 
intended to ensure implementation of the WTO norms and the Union had no 
intention to implement a particular obligation or provision of the WTO law.105 
The CJEU exempted the Union from an obligation to implement panel or 
Appellate Body recommendations within a strict timeframe. 
With reference to Art.216(2) TFEU, the CJEU has initially recognised that 
international agreements concluded by the Union shall have primacy over 
provisions of the secondary Union legislation. Therefore, such provisions 
envisaged in secondary legislation must, “so far as possible”, be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with those agreements.106 For example, even if certain 
provisions laid down in Directive 2009/73/EC mention liability of the market 
participants concerning international obligations, secondary law is not explicit 
on the precise reach and scope of such provisions in relation to international 
law.107 Namely, even if the WTO law has primacy over provisions laid down in 
TEP, from the perspective of the EU law, the CJEU and supra-national 
                                                                                                                        
the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations, December 22, OJ L 336/1, final recital in the 
preamble. 
101 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, December 22, OJ 
L 343, recital 5. 
102 Case C-21/14P, Commission v Rusal Armenal, ECLI:EU:C:2015:494, para. 41. 
103 Bogdany, von Armin, and Makatsch, Tilman. “Collision, Co-existence or Co-operation?” in 
The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 2002, at p. 145. 
104 Portugal v Council, para. 43. 
105 Case C-306/13 LVP NV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2465, para. 58. 
106 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367, paras. 110-111. 
107 Directive 2009/73/EC, Art.11(3)(b)(i) and recitals 21, 22. 
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institutions enjoy a wide margin of discretion in determining how narrowly or 
extensively the legislator has originally intended the provisions at stake to be 
designed. 
Although it is clear that TEP does not provide unconditional and sufficiently 
precise reference to the WTO law, it refers, however, to international 
obligations in general in order to secure the security of supply. Besides, 
apparently that is the reason why Directive 2009/73/EC provides that the 
notion of security of supply, qualifying as an imperative requirement in the EU 
energy law, should be assessed in light of the obligations arising under 
international law, in particular international agreements between the Union and 
third countries in question.108 While Directive 2009/73/EC does not refer 
explicitly to any international legal instrument (e.g. the WTO law), it indirectly 
invokes the matter of international obligations in a rather broad and unspecific 
manner. 
The EU legislator has adopted the so-called “WTO enabling” Regulation No. 
2015/476 (formerly Regulation No. 1515/2001). Art.1 of Regulation No. 
2015/476 establishes the most important idea of this legal instrument. Namely, 
when the DSB adopts a Union measure taken, the Commission has a non-
mandatory right to take one or more of the measures implemented by the 
former, whichever the Commission considers appropriate to either repeal or 
amend the disputed measure, or adopt any other measure deemed to be 
appropriate in the situation in order to ensure the Union’s compliance with the 
recommendations and rulings provided in the reports of the DSB. This, again, 
leaves a wide margin of discretion for supra-national entities of the Union.109 
Overall, this view requires for a more uniform interpretation of provisions of 
the covered agreements regarding members of the WTO, which come from 
different jurisdictions. Essentially, the new interpretations only elaborate more 
on the already existing rights and obligations under the covered agreements. It 
becomes clear that the DSB, when adopting its conclusions, actually binds the 
CJEU.110 
Important to add that in case of an arisen conflict between the EU and the 
WTO norms there is no intent to implement a particular WTO obligation on 
the side of the CJEU. Indeed, in Ikea case the CJEU ascertained that legality of 
the Union law could not be reviewed in light of the WTO law (as interpreted 
by the DSB’s recommendations), since it is clear from the Union law per se, 
which here excluded certain repayment of rights, that the latter did not have an 
intention to give effect to a specific obligation assumed under the WTO.111 
Therefore, the only viable solution for entity providing energy services is to 
challenge incompatible provisions of TEP via the WTO dispute settlement.  
                                                
108 Directive 2009/73/EC, recital 22. 
109 Steinbach, Armin, “EC Liability for Non-compliance with Decisions of the WTO DSB: 
The Lack of Judicial Protection Persists”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 43, Issue 5 (2009): 1047-
1069, at p. 1051.  
110 Tsymbrivska, Oksana, “WTO DSB Decisions in the EC Legal Order: Approach of the 
Community Courts”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 37, Issue 3 (2010): 185-202, at pp. 
198-200. While to date the CJEU refuses panel or Appellate Body reports, adopted by the 
DSB, as being non-binding to the courts of the Union. The practice of the CJEU is that it tries 
to avoid inconsistencies with decisions of the DSB to the greatest possible extent. This 
indicates an indirect observance and respect to decisions provided by the DSB (at p. 202). 
111 Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale, ECLI:EU:C:2007:547, para. 35. 
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4.2. Free trade in services: between the two legal 
regimes 
In terms of services, it should be rather acknowledged whether a measure is 
capable of preventing or significantly impeding the market access of a service 
supplier.112 The core subject matter and prohibition prescribed in Alpine 
Investments case affected offers for investment made to addressees established in 
Member State of service supplier and also offers made to potential recipients in 
other Member States. The CJEU established that the free access to the service 
market was affected and influenced directly in other Member States and was, 
therefore, capable of hindering the intra-Union trade in services.113 
It is argued that the restrictions to be eliminated, according to Art.56 and 57 
TFEU, require not only the abolition of discrimination, but also elimination of 
any restriction, even if indistinctly applicable, for market access to be 
promoted. By contrast, in GATS there is no movement from discrimination to 
restrictions on market access. GATS, thus, remains strictly limited to the 
protection of foreign suppliers and the respective supply of commodity only. 
Slightly different from provisions of the Treaty, GATS does not protect 
domestic service providers in a domestic context, unless market rights are 
affected.114 The requirement of non-discrimination covers both services and 
service providers under GATS. 
In comparison to the EU law and in conformity with the WTO law, the Panel 
has implemented a rather broad and extensive view of the scope of GATS, as 
well as of the notion “affecting”. It is, every measure can be caught and fall 
within the scope of GATS in so far it affects the supply of a service even to a 
very small extent.115 First of all, it does not matter whether such a measure 
applies directly to a supply of service. Secondly, it is irrelevant if the measure 
regulates other matters but, nevertheless, affects trade in services for the 
measure to be caught by the scope of GATS.116  
The general question here is the focus on how the measure, in fact, affects the 
supply of the pipeline services and/or the service suppliers involved. For 
instance, Art.17(1)(c) of Directive 2006/123/EC (Directive on the services) 
ascertains that the freedom to provide services in another Member State shall 
not be applicable to the gas sector. The preamble of Directive 2006/123/EC, 
furthermore, signifies its application to “providers established in a Member 
                                                
112 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, ECLI:EU:C:1995:126. 
113 Ibid, paras. 35-38. 
114 Cottier, Thomas, and Oesch Matthias, “Direct and Indirect Discrimination in WTO law 
and EU law”, (2011) NCCR Trade Regulation Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research 
(Working paper No 2011/16), at p.9. Accessed August 22, 2016. http://www.nccr-
trade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/hi/CottierOeschNCCRWP16.pdf 
115 Nancy J. King, and Kishani Kalupahana, “Choosing Between Liberalization and Regulatory 
Autonomy under GATS: Implications of U.S.- Gambling for Trade in Cross Border E-
Services”, Vand. J. Transnat’l L., Vol. 40, Issue 5 (2007): 1189-1300, at p. 1207. 
116 Supra note 96, at p. 228. 
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State” only, and this directive “does not cover external aspects”. Wording 
explicitly disregards the framework of GATS.117 
Reasoning, with regard to the market access of like pipeline services and 
service suppliers, indicates similarities between both legal frameworks. 
However, the EU rules on the issue scrutinised are much more elaborated. 
Even if the infrastructure exemption regime and the Commission’s decisional 
tendencies imply that different decisions regarding the same pipeline services 
and pipeline service suppliers continue to take place, it could qualify as an 
indistinctly applicable measure. In such a situation it would be an indirect 
discrimination on the part of the Commission.  
As there exists de facto unequal treatment in relation to exemptions granted to 
the new gas infrastructure, any rule is liable to hinder or make less attractive 
the exercise of freedom to provide services. Hence, it has to be determined 
whether exemption regime fulfils four cumulative imperative requirements as 
provided in Gebhard case. In practice, and first of all, the Commission decisions 
are issued in a rather discriminatory manner, where each new and particular 
infrastructure is exempted on a case-by-case basis without consistent and 
explicit guidelines offered by the Commission. Secondly, in general terms, the 
public interest could be promoted by such diverse decisional practice anyway 
as it still could make the competition more effective between the services and 
service suppliers. Indeed, such type of exemption policy as it exists currently, 
could be a suitable instrument, which secures that one monopolist does not 
foreclose the market. The fourth condition indicates that in the present 
practice the Commission usually goes beyond what is necessary when granting 
a specific type of infrastructure exemption as will be seen in the further 
research.118  
 
4.3. Art. II:1 of GATS and the new infrastructure 
exemption regime 
In general, Art. II:1 of GATS prohibits discrimination between like services 
and service suppliers from different countries. The aim of the MFN treatment 
obligation and the principle of non-discrimination, prescribed in Art II:1 of 
GATS, is to “ensure equality of opportunity for services and service suppliers 
from all WTO members.”119 MFN treatment is there to guarantee a level 
playing field in all sectors, “whether or not the service sector has been the 
subject of a market access or national treatment commitment”.120 The different 
treatment renders it more difficult for undertakings to exercise the right to 
                                                
117 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, 28 December 2006, OJ L 376, 36-68. Recital 16.  
118 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para. 37. 
119 Van Hoorn, Victor, “Unbundling”, “Reciprocity” and the European Internal Energy 
Market: WTO Consistency and Broader Implications for Europe”, European Energy & 
Environmental Law Review, Vol. 18, Issue 1 (2009): 51-76, at p. 64. 
120 There is also a possibility to limit the MFN obligation of Art. II:1 of GATS by listing an 
exemption under Art. II:2 of GATS. 
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provide transport services via natural gas pipelines, being qualified as new 
major gas infrastructure. 
Scholars suggest that the meaning of Art. II:1 of GATS covers not only de jure, 
but includes also de facto discrimination.121 Although, the exemption granted by 
the Commission in case of OPAL decision required a Russian supplier 
(described as a dominant undertaking) to implement a “gas release” program, 
which required to sell 3 billion cubic meters of its gas annually at a 
government-set, fixed price to competing gas suppliers on the Czech market. 
The requirement was imposed regardless of what amount of additional 
capacity is booked by the Russian supplier if it is willing to exceed 50 per cent 
cap on the ability to operate the OPAL pipeline. Indeed, while there is no 
equivalent and similar requirement imposed in other decisions and on other 
suppliers, it could qualify as a violation of the MFN treatment obligation, 
because “[only] a Member that bans trade with all foreign suppliers does not 
violate MFN”.122 
Pursuant to Art. XVII:3 of GATS, treatment could be considered as less 
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of a particular 
WTO member and the respective services and/or service suppliers. Thus, as 
the WTO itself argues, article intends to cover any laws or regulations.123 Such 
a treatment shall also cover any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity. As a 
consequence, an undertaking active in the gas sector, which is willing to be 
active also in the supply market, will be in a potentially less favourable position 
than one of its competitors, which have a possibility to use the exempted 
major gas infrastructure being subject to different conditions applicable (as 
decided by the Commission). 
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5. Exemptions and access to the relevant 
infrastructure 
The principle of TPA is perceived to be the first step in establishing 
competitive access. It is aimed at creating capacity to compete, which enlarges 
the market for suppliers of commodity and allows consumers a wider choice of 
their supplier.124 So the owners of the network agree or are obliged by law to 
allow the transit of commodity belonging to third parties for reasonable access 
tariffs (regulated access) with no possibility of individual exemptions or 
discounts. Competition law regards TPA as the exception to the rule that 
companies (even dominant ones) are not required to aid their competitors with 
extra efforts. Regulation, on the other hand, establishes TPA as the main 
principle with a limited number of possible exemptions.125 Therefore, the 
author tries to evaluate the implication of sector specific regime governing 
access to infrastructure and its exemptions.  
In order for the infrastructure to be exempted, it has to meet several, not 
always strictly cumulative, but exhaustive, criteria as envisaged in Art.36 of 
Directive 2009/73/EC: 1) enhance competition in gas supply and security of 
supply, 2) be too risky to be invested in infrastructure unless exempted, 3) be 
owned by an entity legally separate from the system operators in whose 
systems it will be built, 4) infrastructure should charge its users, 5) exemption 
should not be detrimental to competition in general or the effective 
functioning of the internal market, or of the regulated system to which 
infrastructure would be connected. Moreover, “when deciding whether to 
grant exemption, consideration shall be given, on a case-by-case basis, to the 
need to impose conditions regarding the duration of the exemption […]”. 
When deciding on such matter, the account should be taken of “the additional 
capacity to be built or the modification of existing capacity, the time horizon of 
the project and national circumstances”.126 When the competent authority 
issues a notification to the Commission regarding the exemption decision, the 
information shall include, inter alia, also how and to what extent such 
infrastructure would contribute, in terms of security of supply, “to the 
diversification of gas supply”.127 
 
                                                
124 Onal, Mehmet, “Third Party Access Rights Regime Under European Union Rules for 
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5.1. Shaping the principle of third party access 
in light of competition 
Since Art.32 of Directive 2009/73/EC establishes the general rule that TPA 
must be provided, Art.36 determines that major new gas infrastructures may, 
upon request, be exempted for a defined period of time from Art.32. Since 
TPA is a legal principle, exemptions should only be awarded if and insofar as 
they are necessary. Therefore, necessity and proportionality test should be 
invoked for the analysis in order to adjust the duration of exemption and the 
extent (percentage) of capacity to which exemption applies. 
Directive 2009/73/EC also sets the general framework for the refusal of 
access (Art.35). The provision also adds that where there is a refusal on the 
basis of lack of capacity, Member States take necessary measures to enhance 
the network “as far as it is economic to do so or when a potential customer is 
willing to pay for them”. Art.35(2) therefore envisages a positive requirement 
for Member States to ensure and provide mandatory guidance to natural gas 
undertakings. Therefore, in order to justify refusal of access in accordance with 
Art.35(1), gas undertaking shall first demonstrate that no capacity is available. 
Such a refusal, however, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Art.35 thus 
cannot be interpreted as a static provision. 
The Commission requires project promoters to conduct a market test to 
measure demand before they can obtain an exemption.128 Moreover, project 
promoters should not only test the market demand, but should also act in 
compliance with such test. Indeed, this may require project developers to make 
changes in their plans if the market demand appears to be greater than they 
had first anticipated. As the competition assessment should have a strong 
forward-looking element, it may lead to analytical difficulties if there are strong 
signals from the market that firm’s current dominance may disappear in the 
(near) future.129 In case if a planned infrastructure project would constitute 
natural monopoly, the access regime shall be particularly strict, which indicates 
that exemption from TPA is not given easily.130 The existence of market test 
signifies the “give-aways”, which project developer has to bear in order to 
preserve its business and commercial viability as regards development of the 
project. 
In fact, the Commission even emphasises that “the new infrastructure should 
have the effect of decreasing the market power of the dominant undertaking” 
and there should also be significantly improved possibilities for non-dominant 
entities to enter the concerned markets or possibilities to expand their market 
positions in such markets.131 Hence, the share of capacity in new infrastructure, 
                                                
128 Commission of the European Communities. “Commission staff working document 
(working paper) on Article 22 of Directive 2003/55/EC concerning common rules for the 
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held by the dominant entity, should be substantially lower than its initial 
market share. Such a view, presented by the Commission, implies that this 
would disqualify any request from dominant entity with a shareholding in the 
project that is higher than its current market share. Although, by putting too 
much attention on dominant entity’s present market share and its share of 
capacity in new infrastructure would lead to a situation in which a monopolist 
would be allowed to book much higher share of capacity than entity that barely 
meets the dominance threshold – even though the rules should be toughest on 
those with the highest degree of market power.132 
 
5.2. The devil lies in the detail: exemptions and 
their reasoning 
Too strict approach to dominant firms entails a risk of decreasing incentives to 
invest in new infrastructure; which may be to detriment of the market as a 
whole – here in the pipeline networks and the related cross-border 
interconnections. In general, the idea behind exemption regime is to balance 
long-term (dynamic) efficiency gains over short-term (allocative) advantages in 
light of the market liberalisation process. For instance, security of supply has 
been invoked as a justification to exemptions regarding several new liquefied 
natural gas regasification terminals (mainly due to alternative sources of natural 
gas supplies from non-EU countries).133 Although, the only situation in which 
such an exemption would perhaps not be granted is where owner of the facility 
is an incumbent and new infrastructure would in future increase its market 
dominance and/or where such investment would have a negative impact on 
the investment conditions for other new major gas infrastructure projects (i.e. 
infrastructure of same type).134 Idea here lies within the fact that anti-
competitive effects might outweigh the positive security benefits. However, 
viable option still is a temporary right to supra-normal profits and extended 
monopoly in exchange for new facilities. 
Apparently the most common concern for the Commission is that the newly 
built capacity should not go to dominant players in such a manner that they 
expand their market share or manage to foreclose the competition. Therefore, 
capacity caps are imposed in order to avoid such a risk.135 It is established that 
most of these decisions do not really provide regulatory relax, but rather 
change the regulatory framework in such a manner as to maximise the gains 
from the new investment – no balancing of positive and negative effects is 
performed. Furthermore, exemption rather removes a regulatory obligation in 
                                                
132 Supra note 125, at p. 340. 
133 See, for instance, Commission decision of LNG Porto Empedocle (IT) (C (2012) 3123) and 
Commission decision of National Grid Grain LNG (UK) (C (2013) 3443).  
134 Talus, Kim. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2013, at p. 97. 
135 Commission decision of May 16, 2013 on the exemption of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
from the requirements on third party access, tariff regulation and ownership unbundling laid 
down in Articles 9, 32, 41(6), 41(8) and 41(10) of Directive 2009/73/EC. C(2013) 2949 final. 
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those cases where that obligation would be counterproductive to the aims of 
energy legislation.136  
At the same time, complicated reasoning by the Commission in its decisions 
illustrates a careful assessment of the competitive risks. Namely, the more 
recent decisions indicate the analysis of structure of competition closely, by 
looking, for instance, at the incentives and capacity of project participants to 
foreclose the market. The major concern is, nevertheless, that exemption 
procedure is not carried out in a manner, which subsequently balances risks to 
competition and the corresponding increase in investment properly. 
 
5.2.1. Gazelle decision 
In this decision the Commission engaged in balancing the positive and negative 
effects of the exemption.137 This project connects, via the Czech Republic, two 
areas of Germany. With regard to balancing between the costs and benefits, 
the Commission, however, envisaged a risk that this new pipeline might result 
in other pipelines being underutilised with resulting higher costs for those 
using that other pipeline.138 As a result, any possible price increase would be 
small, while the benefits resulting from exemption would be significant.139 
The Commission acknowledged that risks surrounding Gazelle are closely 
linked to OPAL and therefore aligned duration of exemption of these two 
projects (22 years).140 With regard to the upstream production markets, Gazelle 
was not about to strengthen Gazprom’s market power. The Commission 
determined that there will be a change of gas transits to OPAL, which meant 
that the construction of Gazelle is about to ensure that competitors of 
Gazprom still would have sufficient import capacities.141 Similarly, the 
Commission observed that Gazelle does not lead to strengthening of the 
market position of an entity, which is the most important player on the Czech 
wholesale and retail markets.142  
However, the Commission proposed several amendments. First of all, 
Gazelle’s operator has a duty to offer and provide adequate capacity for bi-
directional flows of commodity, ensuring that Gazelle enhances security of 
supply.143 Secondly, the national authority shall ensure that the users of 
infrastructure have a right and capacity to trade their contractual capacities on 
the secondary market.144 
 
                                                
136 Lowe, Philip, and Marquis, Mel. European Competition Law Annual 2012: Competition, Regulation 
and Public Policies, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, section 4.2. regarding gas infrastructure. 
137 Commission decision of May 20, 2011 on the exemption of the “Gazelle” interconnector 
according to Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC. C(2011) 3424 final. Paras. 27-36 and paras. 
63-69. 
138 Ibid, paras. 63-65. 
139 Supra note 128, paras. 67-69.  
140 Supra note 128, paras. 55-56. 
141 Supra note 128, para. 33. 
142 Supra note 128, para. 34. 
143 Supra note 128, para. 44 and 51. See also Art.7 of Regulation No.994/2010. 
144 Supra note 137, Article 5 at p. 15. 
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5.2.2. Poseidon decision 
The Commission acknowledged fact that the dominant supplier controlled all 
gas import infrastructures was of significance. Effects on the markets with 
exemption were seen as positive but limited, compared to the potential 
additional capacity that could be made available.145 As there was a potential for 
additional capacity, the Commission imposed a number of conditions on the 
national decision, including a requirement of market testing (via Open Season 
procedure146) to make full use of all the technical capacity reasonably available 
to third parties. Assumption was made that the intended effects of the project 
would also depend on whether it would provide access for new producer 
countries, which had not previously supplied the country. Indeed, if this were 
the case, the positive effect of security of supply on national and the EU level 
would be substantially stronger.147  
Moreover, the Commission took into account another condition for granting 
exemption, being related to the level of risk that the investor must 
demonstrate. It also noted that risks involved in the case of “traditional” and 
“non-traditional” sources of gas supply were different.148 Therefore, the 
Commission required that this difference, regarding risks involved, should be 
reflected in the final decision and gave discretion to national authorities in 
determining whether and to what extent different derogation periods should be 
granted, depending on the actual origin of the gas eventually contracted for 
with respect to the pipeline, and amend the decision based on these factors.149 
 
5.2.3. OPAL decision 
In this decision the national regulator granted an exemption for the flow of gas 
into the Czech Republic for 22 years, but not for flows within Germany or for 
reverse flows. Furthermore, authority made TPA conditional upon various 
requirements with the aim to prevent capacity hoarding and ensure proper 
congestion management. The Commission, however, amended the national 
decision, and imposed additional conditions.  
While it considered that OPAL (land extension of the offshore Nord Stream 
pipeline) is beneficial to security of supply, partly because it would be supplied 
                                                
145 Talus, Kim. Vertical Natural Gas Transportation Capacity, Upstream Commodity Contracts and EU 
Competition Law (Energy and Environmental Law & Policy Series (Vol:18): Supranational and 
Comparative Aspects). Edited by Kurt Deketelaere. Kluwer Law International, 2011, at p. 110. 
146 ERGEG Guidelines for Good Practice on Open Season Procedures, May 21, 2007, Ref. 
C06-GWG-29-05C. A two-step process, whereas in the first stage the entity (usually the 
network operator) assesses demand by shippers for infrastructure services in order to 
implement potential projects (e.g. costs, volume) – how much infrastructure the market 
actually needs and under what terms it would like this infrastructure to be marketed. In the 
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mechanisms for this service to the participants in the open season. The resulting capacity then 
could be allocated on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis. 
147 Commission decision of May 22, 2007, Poseidon exemption decision. SG-Greffe (2007) 
D/203046. 
148 Supra note 145, at p. 108. 
149 Supra note 147, at p. 7. 
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by Nord Stream150, the Commission expressed competition related concerns151 
and was concerned that the pipeline cannot achieve the completion of Czech 
market and thus imposed a capacity cap of 50 per cent on the capacity that any 
dominant firm may acquire. The Commission was mainly concerned about the 
risk that dominant firms would be able to book a high percentage of capacity. 
However, the cap could be exceeded if gas release, 3 billion cubic meters a 
year, to the market was implemented, otherwise 50 per cent of capacity has to 
be auctioned off to third parties.152 Nevertheless, such gas release should have 
been accompanied by the corresponding capacity release and the German 
regulator had to approve both release programmes. German regulator 
modified the national exemption in line with these conditions.153 
Scholars argue that it would have been valuable if the Commission had offered 
a more detailed reasoning concerning the dominance of Gazprom as such 
analysis can be derived from decisions discussed beforehand. Indeed, while 
Gazprom has an export monopoly concerning the supply of Russian gas, it is 
less clear from the Commission’s decision how this position impacts OPAL 
pipeline itself. Gazprom has refrained from the gas release. It decided, 
however, to opt for an option to use only 50 per cent of the pipeline.154 At the 
same time, Nord Stream functions and operates underutilised (around 40 per 
cent of capacity used).155 Indeed, as the commodity flows through Nord 
Stream from Russia (and therefore from Gazprom), it does not necessarily 
mean that Gazprom remains a dominant player throughout the various 
segments of OPAL pipeline. Therefore, the Commission currently lacks a 
proper reasoning with regard to the dominance, which results in a wide-
reaching legal uncertainty.156 
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5.2.4. Other decisions of relevance 
Similarly, NEL pipeline, owned also partly by a Russian service supplier, was 
denied request for the exemption on the basis that pipeline does not qualify as 
an interconnector. Although in NEL pipeline decision the definition of 
interconnector in Art.2(17) of Directive 2009/73/EC was interpreted strictly in 
denying exemption for NEL, exemption requests were granted to the third 
country service suppliers or owners of other pipelines, which also do not 
qualify for the definition of an interconnector in the secondary legislation.157   
On the contrary, despite requirements that the transmission system line must 
“cross or span the borders” of two Member States and be built for the “sole 
purpose” as envisaged in the secondary legislation, the TAP pipeline was 
granted exemption even though it does not meet these requirements. To be 
more explicit, pipeline leaves the EU and then returns to the EU via the initial 
non-EU state (spans the border). Since pipeline crosses a non-EU country, the 
Commission granted pipeline an exemption and decided that the term 
“interconnector” shall be interpreted so as to encompass that “[…] gas 
pipelines which span the borders of (at least) two EU Member States, 
regardless as to whether the territory of an non-EU country is crossed in 
between.”158 The Commission rather interprets the concept “interconnectors 
between Member States” broadly, otherwise it would exclude pipelines, which 
connect Member States, but happen to start, end, or cross a third country.159  
Nevertheless, the Commission did not address the issue that TAP pipeline 
supplies gas also to non-EU country. Hence, the sole purpose of TAP pipeline 
is not only related to the connection of transmission systems of two Member 
States, but also includes one non-EU country as a direct beneficiary. Indeed, 
such a principle that the connection between states shall be built for the sole 
purpose of connecting national transmission systems of Member States, being 
the key element of definition of the interconnector, in this decision is not 
observed. Also from both, NEL and TAP, decisions it is clear that the 
Commission lacks proper consistency in its reasoning regarding the definition 
of elements falling under the secondary legislation. 
With regard to investment in the private infrastructure, while there is a lack of 
quantitative specifications on costs or technical characteristics specified in 
Directive 2009/73/EC, exemption was awarded, for instance, to BBL160 
pipeline project, which was relatively inexpensive – 0,5 billion euro (if one has 
to consider and measure the scale of investments by standards in the natural 
gas industry). This indicates that also an inexpensive project is capable to 
obtain exemption if it meets a set of criteria and creates a situation where it is 
inconvenient to refuse exemption to any project. In terms of Art.36(1)(b), 
which requires entity to demonstrate the existence of risks, in BBL decision 
                                                
157 Supra note 1, at p. 4. 
158 Supra note 135, para. 55. 
159 Directive 2009/73/EC, recital 35 expressly envisages that “the possibility of temporary 
derogation should apply, for security of supply reasons, in particular to new pipelines within 
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160 Commission decision of July 12, 2005, BBL exemption decision. CAB D(2005) 674. 
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exemption was accepted even on the basis of risks being insignificant to the 
project.161 
On the other hand, the starting point when granting these exemptions is 
developed mainly on the assumption and idea that infrastructure constructed 
for a specific purpose should be qualified as a sunk cost. Hence, as a 
consequence, in the event if there exists insufficient demand for the 
infrastructure built, the losses would be considerable.162 However, the initial 
presumption for entities, which start investing in capacity, is rather the 
protection of their own interests to operate in the internal market - at least in a 
long run. From the perspective of sector specific rules, nevertheless, there 
continues to occur a regulatory dilemma either to take into account solely the 
intentional element of entity, which is willing to invest in infrastructure, or 
interpret criteria laid down in Art.36 statically. 
 
                                                
161 Ibid, at pp. 3-4.  
162 Talus, Kim. Introduction to EU Energy Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, at p. 40. 
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6. The outlook of dynamic efficiencies. Are 
there any incentives to invest and innovate? 
This chapter evaluates the relationship between Art.102(b) TFEU, i.e. refusal 
to deal, and infrastructure exemptions. As the author has discussed before, 
Directive 2009/73/EC fails to provide any quantitative criteria for granting an 
exemption. Art.36 itself does not contain any quantitative financial or technical 
characteristics of infrastructure to be considered as “major new gas 
infrastructure” or infrastructure providing “significant increases of capacity”. 
In theory, all gas infrastructure projects could be considered as very expensive, 
thus all of them would be able to fall within the category of “major” projects 
and as providing “significant increases” in capacity. Therefore, any 
infrastructure project could be exempted. Apparently, Directive 2009/73/EC 
only prescribes that exemption shall be of limited duration, without any 
specification as regards its maximum length. To be more precise, Directive 
2009/73/EC increases powers of the Commission in the process of granting 
exemptions, but does not improve the issue of transparency.163 
Article 102(b) TFEU prescribes that “(…) limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers” is a violation. Therefore, 
dominant entity is capable to limit the activities that of its rivals on the market 
if no prejudice to consumers result. 
Being similar to sectorial legislation on granting exemptions, the Commission 
is entitled to adopt at any time decisions under Article 102(b) TFEU, even 
where “a practice has already been the subject of a decision by a national court 
or authority and the decision contemplated by the Commission conflicts with 
that national court’s or authority’s decision”.164 Moreover, the CJEU has held 
that Art.102 TFEU is also applicable where the conduct in question is 
compatible with sector specific regulation and the conduct has been approved 
or encouraged by a regulatory authority.165 Thus, the Commission can 
intervene alongside national competition authorities and regulators. 
If an entity does not choose to invest in a project, which would be eligible for 
exemption as provided by Art.36, it would possibly qualify, in turn, as a refusal 
to deal if the investing entity is dominant on the market concerned and if there 
are requests for capacity from other market participants.166 Therefore, it can be 
                                                
163 Yafimava, Katja, “Transit: The EU energy acquis and the Energy Charter Treaty” in Research 
Handbook on International Energy Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, at pp. 606-607. 
164 Case C-344/98 Masterfoods and HB, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689, para. 48. 
165 Case C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603, paras. 80-82. Art. 102 
TFEU is inapplicable only in a scenario if the national legislation itself creates a legal 
framework, which completely eliminates any possibility of competitive activity to take emerge. 
166 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, OECD, “Policy 
Roundtables – Refusals to Deal 2007”, (2009) DAF/COMP(2007)46. Accessed August 14, 
2016. https://www.oecd.org/daf/43644518.pdf. The refusal of essential facilities (refusal to 
deal) takes place when no relevant access to the requesting party or a competitor is granted. 
However, such access is essential for the party in order to participate in the downstream 
market. Doctrine requires the holder of facility to impose reasonable access conditions for an 
adequate fee (at pp. 9-10). For instance, system operator does not invest in cross-border 
projects to increase available transmission capacity, because it might have a negative impact on 
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argued that Art.102(b) TFEU, in form of a refusal to deal, offers a specific 
framework for the design and application of TPA and the corresponding rules 
of the sector specific regulation.167 In contrary to exemption regime under 
Art.36, the structure of refusal to deal, by its own nature, cannot incorporate 
and take into account other objectives, such as security of supply and 
investment incentives. Refusal to deal is an instrument, which functions mainly 
as a corrective tool for market failures, while Art.36 functions as a factor for 
promotion of the market development.168 Moreover, refusal to deal is less 
flexible than regulation, which concerns the technicalities and the different 
objectives that latter evaluates. With regard to exemption regime and, secondly, 
unilateral conduct concerning the energy infrastructure, in a situation where 
competition is already limited, dominant entity has even a stricter obligation to 
avoid anti-competitive behaviour.  
Even if sectorial rules try to largely adopt and incorporate competition 
principles, the Commission seems to accept that when sector specific 
regulation does not achieve results in certain situations, it has an option to 
apply rules on competition in such cases.169 Some scholars even argue that in 
the process of liberalisation of energy markets competition law has gained 
priority over the former.170 As regards the capacity in energy infrastructure, 
competition rules seem to supplement the shortcomings of sectorial rules. 
Therefore, the author assumes that regulation, i.e. Art.35 and Art.36, is lex 
specialis in relation to Art.102(b) TFEU, as lex generalis, in so far and to the 
extent to which both cover the same issues, whereas normally the former rules 
should be applied instead. It could be argued that if there exists a potential 
competition issue and the entity possesses ability to amend and/or remedy its 
behaviour, the competition law can be enforced.  In the subsequent analysis 
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the author takes into account the intention of sector specific regulation and 
that it is not about to substitute rules on competition, although it does not 
define to what extent the latter would be applied.  
 
6.1. Strategic underinvestment 
The general understanding under the notion of “strategic underinvestment” 
seems to be that while the essential facilities doctrine is limited to the access 
refusals, where no objective justification for the refusal exists, “strategic 
underinvestment” seems to exclude certain objective justifications (e.g. the 
capacity is in full use) and even requires extensions of capacity under this 
doctrine – an expanded version of essential facilities doctrine. Furthermore, the 
Commission explicitly envisages the fact that if the current capacities are 
actually used by the holder of essential facility for its own supply business, it is 
not enough to exclude abuse under Art.102(b) TFEU.171 In terms of essential 
facilities, it should not be mechanically assumed that an easy access to the 
essential infrastructure automatically leads to a healthier competition to 
emerge.172 Similarly, it has to be understood that refusal to deal usually is not 
solely based on a genuine lack of capacity. Refusal to deal is rather enabled in a 
situation of inefficient operations or unwillingness of the entity to overcome 
capacity constraints.173 
The Commission’s Guidance Paper, as a starting point, has distinguished that if 
property is a result of significant investment, then refusal to deal is, in theory, 
justifiable.174 In principle, such a view is supported by the necessity of 
dominant player to recoup adequate return on investments for the 
development of inputs, likewise in Art.36(1). With regard to efficiencies, 
Guidance Paper then goes further and demands dominant entity to 
demonstrate if entity has refused access to facilities, including any negative 
impact, which an obligation to share the input is likely to have on its own level 
of innovation.175 As regards exemption regime under Art.36 and by analogy 
Art.102(b) TFEU, if dominant entity has previously supplied the input in 
question, but with the new increased capacities refuses to do so; it does not, in 
fact, affect incentives to innovate on side of the dominant entity.176 Moreover, 
in the absence of new capacity constructed, such an investing entity would not 
be able to pursue commercial activities on the market.  
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6.1.1. GDF, ENI and the network foreclosure 
Both GDF177 and ENI178 cases consider network foreclosure as a direct form of 
abuse of dominant position. In GDF case transmission system operator 
abstained from investing in import capacity and additional capacity of LNG 
terminal. In this case the financial analysis indicated that the construction of 
additional capacity would have been sufficiently profitable to transmission 
system operator due to the existing capacity requests. Consequently, GDF 
made a commitment either to release constrained capacity or to create 
additional capacity.179 In essence, the Commission considered that it was 
abusive for GDF to reserve its own pipeline capacity for itself, even if the 
capacity was fully used. When decision was adopted, a new principle also 
stepped in – it is abusive for dominant entity (shipper of commodity) to 
reserve capacity in its pipeline for a long period of time.180 
Similarly, in ENI case the entity was active on the gas transportation and 
supply markets. Decision there, similar to GDF foreclosure case, was not based 
on the profitability of expansion projects - on long-term capacity demand from 
competitors. Transmission system operator did not explore the possible offers 
in terms of the financial contribution to infrastructure expansions. The 
Commission had concerns over the intention of ENI to strategically refrain 
from carrying out, proposing or agreeing to investments in additional capacity 
on the relevant import infrastructure. By such a strategy ENI had intention to 
keep the import capacity fully packed, thus maximising its revenues on the 
downstream market. In addition, it did not evaluate any third party demand via 
Open Season procedure.181  
In GDF case entity made commitment to immediately release a large amount 
of its long-term reservations of gas import capacity at several entry points, and 
then to continue reducing its share below 50 per cent of these reservations i.e. 
a mandatory requirement to implement long-term release of at least 50 per 
cent. According to the Commission, threshold of 50 per cent of the total 
capacity enables the right balance between the rights of entity and the need to 
create competitive market conditions and the capacity to compete.182 The 
Commission was able to rely on the financial analysis provided by GDF, which 
actually indicated that investment would have been beneficial and profitable 
after all.183  
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In essence, ENI did not take any positive step to meet the needs of third 
parties for additional capacity and even decided to ignore such demands. In 
contrast to GDF decision, it was not even necessary for the Commission to 
make an in-depth evaluation whether the investment in additional capacity 
would have been technically and economically viable.184 Nevertheless, a very 
similar approach as regards the 50 per cent capacity cap was also pursued in 
OPAL decision. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the intent of the 
Commission is to view Art.102 TFEU and Art.36 as parallel and even 
overlapping systems. Whereas in both scenarios it is crucial that decision 
should require that exemption enhances competition and that it cannot be 
detrimental to competition per se. Art.102(b) TFEU itself does not require any 
enforced obligation to invest. Thus, forced investment has developed from the 
obligation of forced sharing. 
 
6.2. Comparative analysis on the instruments for 
innovation 
As the present research concerns cross-border interconnectors only, the 
exemption-seeking applicant has a positive requirement to show that this 
infrastructure has a positive effect on competition because it simply allows 
access and entry of a new competitor to the market. However, the regulatory 
framework concerning Art.102(b) TFEU and Art.36, both, is based on the 
assumption that a competitive market structure automatically improves security 
of supply. Thus, it could be argued that one should consider competition and 
security of supply as indivisible elements. Then, by definition, a new supply 
route is capable to improve competition and also make improvements in the 
energy security.185  
On the other hand, new capacity constructed is not functional on the market 
itself (i.e. infrastructure cannot diversify the gas supply itself), as Art.36 does 
not refer to any possible and real providers of gas supplies, which are, in fact, 
the real contributors to the diversification of gas supply. In this scenario, entity 
willing to make the infrastructure expansions, pursuant to Art.36, acts ex ante, 
as it forecasts the capacity needed for its own activities concerning 
transportation and supply markets. Under Art.102 TFEU, nonetheless, the 
energy security is improved when dominant entity makes the necessary 
adjustments and/or investments in the relevant interconnectors. Such 
decisions implemented should be considered ex post, as only after the actions, 
taken by dominant entity, there occurs an intervention by the relevant 
authority. 
Theoretically the requirement of “competition to be increased” removes the 
possibility of entities, being in dominant position, to apply for exemption as 
provided in secondary law. Then the total impact of the investments on 
competition could be considered as potentially negative. Nevertheless, even if 
investors, having dominant position, undertake the project implementation, it 
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should not be automatically concluded that project itself has an adverse effect 
on competition and the functioning of markets concerned.186 
As regards the incentives to invest, AG Jacobs in Bronner case, for example, 
argues that in a long run it is pro-competitive and in the best interest of 
consumers to allow entity to maintain for its own use the infrastructure it has 
developed solely for the purpose of its own business, because then also 
investment is not endangered. Otherwise, if the access to essential facility 
would be allowed easily, there would be lack of incentives for competitors to 
develop a competing infrastructure. After all, as AG suggests, while 
competition would be boosted in the short-term, it would be decreased in the 
long-term.187 However, again, this is also a controversial view that every entity 
operating in the relevant market will be only free riding on the inputs, with a 
total decline in innovation concerning new capacities. The author observes that 
this argument retains valid as, indeed, when there is a forced sharing of 
infrastructure, which includes high costs and risky investments, it could be as 
an obstacle to any incentives to innovate. Another view is that the assertion 
suggested by AG Jacobs is invalid for gas industry due to the financial input 
that a newcomer has to bear in order to start operations on the infrastructure 
related markets, which are usually already occupied by the existing historical 
and dominant competitors (incumbents). 
On the contrary, it is generally perceived that competition law is more 
forthcoming towards access rights and much stricter regarding refusal to deal. 
In so far it concerns investments; there is a presumption that competition law 
itself is not the right tool to be used in the process of designing and 
transforming the market structure or actually to provide incentives for 
innovation.188 Sectorial regulation then is construed and constructed so as to 
build the market more functional, which could also include imposition of new 
duties. However, it is not that in all cases the Commission intervenes with 
Art.102 TFEU and obliges entities to risk with costly investments to promote 
the entry and growth that of competitors.189 An option for dominant entity is 
to adopt alternative organisational solutions to reorganise the limited capacity. 
Some scholars suggest that there should not be a false dilemma, as it exists at 
the present stage, between open access to infrastructure and the market in 
development, with regard to the incentives to invest.190 This can also be 
considered as a conflict between long-term and short-term competition – a 
balance between sectorial regulation and Art.102 TFEU. Both solutions, 
however, promote certain benefits in their application, albeit each individually 
bears serious dangers and arising costs. The unilateral application of either 
option bears considerable shortcomings. For instance, competitor prescribed 
in the Commission’s decision expressed intent to build infrastructure for its 
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own commercial operations, but was rejected to do so by the owner. The 
outcome of decision was, in fact, that the owner was the one responsible, 
already from the beginning, to take into account the likely interest for 
infrastructure.191  
The only feasible solution would be combining sectorial rules with the primary 
law on competition, which then would balance costs and benefits in the most 
efficient, economically lucrative and socially (i.e. for the benefit of consumers) 
profitable manner. For instance, an amended version of Art.36 could make an 
explicit reference and address, in the wording of article, the issue of strategic 
underinvestment. Thereby, Art.36 would be structured in a textual design to 
include a complete boundary how far the article itself actually extends. But still, 
the duration of protection and refusal to deal in terms of property rights 
should not be detrimental to consumers. Entity can and is entitled to control 
the property in so far it does not cause adverse welfare effects to consumers. 
In the current circumstances it is complex to make adjustments and to merge, 
although only to a certain extent, the primary and secondary law. Indeed, under 
each case and decision the relevant authorities undertake cautious analysis of 
the whole context of each particular situation and the market concerned, 
including careful analysis of the management and regulation of competition in 
general. Under both regimes there is no clear and constantly developing line of 
an explicit decisional practice and the establishment of precedents. There are 
simply too many variables to be determined and linked together in each 
particular decision. 
In turn, for instance, AG Maduro holds a view that any excess in the scope and 
duration of property rights involve balancing the interest of free competition. 
When such a positive balancing occurs, it provides incentive for the investment 
and the technical development to advance and evolve.192 It indirectly implies 
that the rules on exemptions, under Art.36, are not absolute prerogatives with 
an unlimited application in time and unlimited material applicability, as it is 
established by analogy in case KPN Telecom.193 Nevertheless, it does not mean 
that entities, as equivalently efficient competitors to the incumbent, shall enjoy 
fruits of the latter’s commercial success. Whereas Guidance Paper scrutinises 
that if entity would have known in advance that infrastructure will be subjected 
to forced and mandatory sharing, it might have decided contrary; not to 
innovate or pursue it in a very sub-optimal form.194 However, the author 
emphasises that in the absence of necessary investments entity would not be 
able itself to pursue commercial activities on the market.  
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In terms of overall consumer welfare objective, the overall objective is still the 
protection of benefits for consumers, which the competition produces.195 
Therefore, the general view is that sectorial regulation in the energy sector, 
which is capable to threaten or create distortions of competition, is never in 
the interest of consumers. As regards Art.102 TFEU, the CJEU views 
competition rules in the primary law as being designed not only to protect the 
immediate interests of “individual competitors or consumers, but also to 
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such”.196 It 
indicates that the protection of structure of competition leads to consumer 
welfare in a longer term, as opposed to short-term welfare. However, the 
CJEU does not have an unequivocal position on consumer protection. 
Namely, in TeliaSonera Sverige case the CJEU ruled that “Article 102 TFEU 
must be interpreted as referring not only to practices which may cause damage 
to consumers directly […] but also to those which are detrimental to them 
through their impact on competition.”197 This interpretation signifies the 
ambivalent and inconsistent reasoning by the CJEU with regard to the 
thresholds of consumer welfare. 
From an economic point of view, already historically established dominant 
entities tend to invest more in the network industries if the total investments of 
entrants (new competitors) increase.198 In telecommunications sector, for 
example, while the access regulation is not affected by investment of entrants, 
national regulators then tend to respond to larger investment in infrastructure 
by existing incumbent, which can be categorised as Art.36 type of reasoning. 
Consequently, access regulation provides easier access to third parties and thus 
deters incumbent’s interest to invest in the essential infrastructure already at 
first place.199 Similarly, in Telekomunikacja Polska decision the Commission 
concluded that the imposition of access to the upstream inputs, being under 
control of dominant entity, exceeds the need to preserve ex ante incentives to 
invest and exploit essential infrastructure (downstream) only for the benefit of 
one entity.200 
Apart from the CJEU, it seems that the Commission tends to ease the 
requirement regarding the elimination of competition. Telekomunikacja Polska 
decision shows that it is sufficient for likely effects of refusal to supply (input) 
to exist. Hence, it does not automatically mean that rivals were actually forced 
to exit the market. It is enough and sufficient to prove that competitors are put 
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in a disadvantageous position, which thereafter makes them to compete less 
aggressively.201 In the Commission’s perception, entity responsible for the 
network has a duty to provide at least small part of capacity in the relevant 
infrastructure for the competing companies. Accordingly, capacity holder has a 
potential to pursue a tactic, which is to the detriment of competitors in 
reaching their customers and subsequently making a delay in the growth of 
investments.202 
It is questionable whether competition authorities should be entitled to 
implement business decisions with long-term effects, where they have limited 
knowledge, such as Art.102(b) TFEU and the trend of strategic 
underinvestment. From the economic perspective, companies usually tend to 
invest only with an approximate knowledge of future supply and demand, 
sometimes the future market developments even being unknown, including the 
forecasted strategies of rivals. There are scholars who suggest that investments 
should be considered as restructuring the market platform itself rather than 
being a standard for behaviour of competitors within a particular environment 
and setup.203 The idea, underlying operations on the market, should be that 
entities are able to adopt themselves to different investment decisions in terms 
of ability to adapt themselves to risky market fluctuations. 
The stability of regulatory environment also has an impact on investment 
decisions. Nevertheless, Art.102(b) TFEU regulates the conduct if entity only 
abuses the dominant position with different innovative types of such abuses, 
while Art.36 itself is, by definition, a consistent set of rules, which can be 
found also in Directive 2003/55/EC.204 The notion of “investment” is 
interpreted differently by entities, which try to maximise the profit on the 
market, and expert regulators, because both decision makers pursue different 
aims. Thereby, competition authorities themselves are not able to establish 
which investment is actually necessary, has a potential and will provide 
profitability. The author suggests a merged set of legal rules, which elaborate 
more and integrate technical issues and the market peculiarities in one bundle, 
as opposed to the current ex post interventions, which are based on a vision 
how the market behaviour, perfect structure of the market should look like 
(including the compliance with mandatory and stringent methodologies). 
 
6.2.1. A new regulatory perspective: the promotion of 
investments via procedural enforcement? 
While exemptions under Art.36 are implemented by reasoning adopted by the 
Commission, as regards Art.102(b) TFEU and the case of strategic 
underinvestment, it raises obvious doubts about the effectiveness of the latter 
policy, due to its largely extensive nature. To be more specific, it is not a secret 
that decisions regarding strategic underinvestment are adopted by using the 
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commitment procedure envisaged in Art.9 of Regulation No. 1/2003. 
Therefore, such policy is controversial as it is developed by commitments of 
entities concerned and not by reasoned decisions. Indeed, the policy reduces 
transparency and stringency, because cases are terminated by commitments 
decisions, whereas the principles established do not come before the CJEU.205 
Such voluntary commitments, given by the relevant entity, signify the 
willingness to comply with the applicable competition rules, but also signalise 
limited possibilities for appeal. However, this also raises an issue what and 
where to seek the limits of Art.9 of Regulation No. 1/2003. As previously 
discussed, while in GDF decision the company committed to release transport 
capacities to third parties for a substantial period of time and through different 
mechanisms206 (behavioural remedy), in ENI decision the company committed 
to divest parts of its gas transmission networks (structural remedy) i.e. 
ownership unbundling and substantial divestiture of entity’s shareholdings in 
transmission system operators.207  In GDF decision, besides commitments 
proposed by entity, the Commission added and stated that it takes into account 
results of the market test. The Commission was simply comfortable with the 
commitments GDF offered, but decision itself did not conclude whether there 
was an infringement.208 In both ENI and GDF decisions, the comments of 
third parties were taken into consideration through the market testing process. 
The author agrees with other scholars that if entity undertakes a degradation of 
essential infrastructure, e.g. by means of an inefficient capacity management, it 
would have an impact on the overall quality of transportation services provided 
by other businesses in general.209 The author also acknowledges that entities 
can offer commitments even if they know in advance of the charges they could 
possibly face and that such accusations have a potential not to survive the 
judicial review provided by the CJEU.210 From the business perspective it 
seems sensible as entities would have an incentive to avoid the costs and risks 
associated with the continuation of subsequent proceedings and also, then 
prospective, judicial procedure.211 Pursuant to such scenario described, entity 
has a room for manoeuvre. Although, but not very surprisingly, private entities 
and national competition authorities have a tendency to cite and invoke 
commitment decisions as precedents.212 
Indeed, TEP has created a more elaborated system regarding investments in 
infrastructure. In fact, sectorial regulation clearly establishes, pursuant to 
Art.22(7) of Directive 2009/73/EC that the organisational powers of the 
network development and the necessary investment decisions remain with 
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national regulatory authority, not with the Commission.213 Accordingly, only 
transmission service operators and national regulatory authorities participate in 
the planning process, however under economic conditions only.214  
According to Art.9 of Regulation No. 1/2003, in terms of the procedural 
decision-making, the Commission has to state the concerns related to 
competition only in its preliminary assessment. Therefore, an in-depth analysis 
of Art.102(b) TFEU and the corresponding theory of harm is not necessary. 
On the other hand, the Commission implements a far-reaching solution in the 
absence of the final assessment provided by the CJEU.215 With regard to the 
benefits to the market player, the Commission actually makes legally binding 
and entity accepts commitments in the absence of explicit mentioning of any 
infringement committed by the latter. Moreover, the Commission in EDF 
decision prescribed the relevance of ensuring that entity’s commitments are 
linked in an adequate manner and that it takes into account the future 
legislative or regulatory changes and reforms of the state where entity operates, 
and also changes on the Union’s level in its analysis of the proposed 
commitments. Any observations and views, from the perspective of the 
Commission, going beyond this should be considered as disproportionate or 
outside the scope of initiated proceedings as concerns the objections laid down 
in Commission’s Statement of Objections.216 
The CJEU has stepped in to distinguish and elaborate more on the 
commitment procedure in Alrosa217 case. From Alrosa case it can be derived 
that when accepting commitments, the Commission enjoys, in fact, a large 
margin of discretion regarding the proportionality test and the assessment. The 
CJEU by deciding Alrosa case has set the boundaries of the proportionality test 
in Art.9 of Regulation No. 1/2003. Namely, application of the principle of 
proportionality, in terms of Art.9 of Regulation No. 1/2003, is designed in 
order to only verify that the commitments “address the concerns Commission 
expressed to the undertakings concerned and that the latter do not offer less 
onerous commitments that also are able to address those concerns in an 
adequate manner”.218 The CJEU also holds an opinion that it should step in, by 
a judicial review, only in a scenario when the “Commission’s assessment is 
manifestly incorrect.”219 As a consequence, entity then has the option either to, 
first of all, offer far-reaching commitments or, as an alternative option, face the 
risk of an adopted infringement decision bearing fines of high amounts and 
possible remedies too. 
In light of Alrosa case and to the detriment of company, the Commission 
initially lists concerns on the preliminary legal assessment, but afterwards the 
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Commission is actually not bound by a rigid proportionality assessment 
regarding the initial legal assessment conducted. The Commission’s conduct 
now is defined by a wide margin of discretion and thus companies might feel 
endangered so that they would be indirectly forced to offer far more extensive 
commitments as truly necessary in order to get acceptance by the Commission.  
M. Hofmann in his article, therefore, ascertains that the Commission with such 
broad powers goes beyond the mere protection of a competitive market. Also 
by this assessment it could be determined that the Commission performs the 
role of regulatory authorities. The line between sectorial regulation and 
competition law becomes severely blurred also in this situation prescribed. 
Hence, sector specific rules have a possibility to overlap with the regulatory 
framework and the primary law.220 As a result then would be the application of 
two, normally separate, legal formulas and setups now being applied in parallel 
– causing legal uncertainty on the side of companies. Therefore, the theory of 
strategic underinvestment proves itself being problematic, especially 
accompanied with far reaching remedies. The analysis, with respect to the 
commitments, shows that competition and regulation have a tendency to fuse 
together and it has actually already occurred. 
 
                                                
220 Supra note 213, at p. 140. 
 50 
Concluding remarks and reflections for the 
future 
As discussed beforehand, Member States have an opportunity to exercise their 
own competence only in so far where the EU does not exercise or has already 
decided not to exercise its own competence (as explicitly provided in the 
explanatory note on the division of competences).221 Therefore, even if in the 
current state of law the competence still falls under the notion “shared”, the 
EU has a priority right of acting there. This implies that what we consider a 
shared competence in the present situation may be a de facto exclusive 
competence within several years. So that there exists a general presumption 
that even in areas where the EU has already shared its powers, in terms of 
competence, with Member States, such competence is still rather exclusive 
than shared.222 According to R. Wessel, because of the existence of the “duty 
of genuine cooperation” (Art.10 EC Treaty) and the “overriding logic of the 
internal market” as interpreted by the CJEU, the attribution doctrine and its 
narrow boundaries can be not strictly complied with, and essentially ignored 
when transferring the competences to the Union.223 
On the other hand, pursuant to Art.3 TFEU, the EU competition rules fall 
under the Union’s exclusive competence. Exemption regime holds in itself 
principles for the promotion of competitive market structure to develop, while 
strategic underinvestment, related to the natural gas infrastructure, falls 
undoubtedly under the EU’s exclusive competence.  As a consequence, it can 
be derived that in such a situation shared competence meets exclusive 
competence – the expansion of energy (Art.194 TFEU) infrastructure against 
the potential abusive unilateral conduct (Art.102(b) TFEU) in a market 
foreclosure scenario. This clearly establishes a shift from shared to exclusive 
competence, concerning the model subject to analysis. But apparently 
competence in the field of energy becomes rather hybrid. It is also derived 
from the analysis that in the sphere of energy occurs a competence shift – 
agreements being concluded by both the EU and its Member States (being 
mixed agreements to which Member States must give their consent) to the EU 
alone having the power to negotiate and conclude such agreements.  
The author deducts that, by means of regulatory authorities, the evolving 
nature of the energy sector regulation and ex-post enforcement of the EU 
competition rules in the energy sector indicates that the Commission does not 
miss any possibility to increase its competence in the sector or even over-step 
it. Similarly, where the Commission is trying to integrate and liberalise the 
energy markets, by announcing its agenda and enforcing it, there is less 
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competence left for the actions to be taken by Member States.224 Other 
scholars, however, suggest that, with full regard to the previous Treaties and 
the Lisbon regime, the attribution of new powers to the Union cannot occur 
“as the limits of competence have already been reached”.225 The author 
concludes, with regard to the shift in competences and regulatory intervention 
by the Commission concerning infrastructure capacities that hypothesis has to 
be affirmed and actions of the Commission in that regard can be considered as 
ultra vires. 
From the view point of the CJEU, apart from the analysis and fact that an 
individual operating within the EU has limited possibilities to mount a legal 
challenge against the EU legislation on the basis of the WTO law, as there is a 
lack of direct effect. A different perspective has been recognised with regard to 
PCA. In Simutenkov case such an assumption was reversed, as Art.23 of PCA 
holds, although in a slightly different context than energy (i.e. non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality of legally employed workers), the 
direct effect. It remains to be seen as to whether a Russian company, for 
instance, operating on the transmission level within the EU can rely before the 
CJEU directly on other provisions envisaged in PCA. Simutenkov case actually 
clearly shows that the CJEU is active in transposing the notions prescribed in 
the EU substantive and constitutional law into the bilateral agreements of the 
Union without prejudice to their teleological variations.226 
What concerns the relationship with third countries; the current PCA with 
Russia is not detrimental to the Union per se.227 However, since Russia has 
joined the WTO, the expectations of its gas exporters and gas transportation 
services and service suppliers (including the related investment projects) to and 
within the Union are highly increasing, at least in terms of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations. Art.II:1 of GATS, therefore, can be considered as an 
overriding instrument concerning TEP in general as the scope and applicability 
of GATS is broader than, for instance, internal market provisions governing 
the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services. 
A possible solution might entail that a gas exporter country in its cooperation 
and partnership agreement includes a provision that the legal framework for 
e.g. EU-Russia common energy space, natural gas as a commodity in particular, 
shall be Directive 2009/73/EC and the related documents, as far as the EU 
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internal energy acquis is concerned. However, the EU acquis currently does not 
cover and perhaps also will not in future cover the full length of all major gas 
supply chains destined in Member States. There are scholars who suggest that 
the use of the EU acquis for the creation of common energy space would 
actually fail.228 
In terms of the third and fourth research questions, the regulatory use of 
commitments and, thus, the enforcement of Art.102(b) TFEU in the energy 
sector has contributed to the liberalisation of the EU energy markets and has 
brought various benefits, either direct or indirect, for the affected entities. 
Research shows that we have moved to an unavoidable divergence of 
competition and regulation. For example, certain specific elements under the 
regulatory law are unavoidable in the enforcement process of competition law. 
The Commission’s Commitment decisions remain an optimal solution for the 
current market design.  
Likewise, while infrastructure exemption decisions entail a view on future 
developments, the wider the geographic market, the less likely is that a firm can 
fall under the presumption as being dominant. Therefore, the issue of 
dominance is central in Art.36 and Art.102(b) TFEU as the former sets criteria 
that dominant firm should be barred from strengthening its position on the 
newly exempted infrastructure. The Commission statically assumes that the 
augmentation of capacity automatically provides a subsequent rise in 
competition. When granting the access to energy facilities, different economic 
conditions should be taken into consideration, especially where the facilities in 
question are not purely essential or monopolistic.  
The infrastructure exemption regime lacks a proper base for argumentation 
and that is the major concern for investing companies. Two similar legal 
regimes indirectly signalise that the Commission intends to adopt approach of 
regulatory competition – while sector specific regulation is more detailed in 
comparison to essential facilities doctrine and the abuse of strategic 
underinvestment, the former cannot achieve the incentives to innovate as the 
latter uses legal remedies to demand such efficiencies and innovation. The 
Commission has used the opportunities provided by general competition law 
to circumvent the shortcomings of the sector specific regulation. However, 
there should be close and consistent cooperation between the regulators and 
enforcers of competition law because regulation and competition enforcement 
in the EU natural gas market can be expected to co-exist.  
Effective remedies are existent in the ex ante treatment of cross-border pipeline 
transmission capacities in terms of, for instance, Gas Network Codes229. On 
the contrary, ex post perspective indicates that the Commission actively forces 
and imposes its own long-term vision of the market design for the EU natural 
gas transmission markets, and the market growth is up to this supra-national 
body. The author suggests that rules for exemptions and strategic 
underinvestment should merge and by that become more elaborated. While the 
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former provides detailed analysis for the substantive conditions of granting 
exemptions and their procedural guarantees, the latter already implements 
them. Nevertheless, the Commission indeed pursues active antitrust and 
sectorial intervention, but until now such activism results in the overall benefits 
for the internal market in general – the process of market liberalisation is on its 
way.  
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